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Abstract

From 1940-1989, a huge rayon factory—at one time the largest in the
world—operated on the banks of the South Fork of the Shenandoah River in the
Town of Front Royal, Virginia. Three different companies owned the facility:
American Viscose Corporation (AVC) built it in 1939 and ran it until 1963 when
the Food Machinery Corporation (FMC Corp.) conglomerate purchased AVC. In
1976, an FMC executive bought the rayon plant in Front Royal in a leveraged
buyout, renaming the facility Avtex Fibers, Inc.1
From early on, the plant had serious problems with waste materials—
including many toxic substances—produced when manufacturing rayon.
During nearly 50 years of operation, the plant‘s approach to toxic waste was to
rely on insufficient and frequently outdated procedures and technologies,
keeping a significant portion of the waste on-site. The South Fork of the
Shenandoah, a crucial resource for the rayon plant and important ecological
entity in its own right, suffered the consequences.
Although the plant‘s engineers were never able to protect the river, many
outside people—from sport fishermen to state officials—attempted to do so.
Over the plant‘s operating life, changes in environmental awareness led to
changes in law that ultimately caught up with the plant. In 1989, after years of
controversy, Avtex Fibers closed its doors. The operations might have ceased
sooner were it not for close connections between the rayon plant and the

1

For the past several decades, news reports and local parlance have referred to the facility as ―the
Avtex plant,‖ a name now deeply associated with Superfund designation, cost litigation, and site
remediation. This study looks beyond the Avtex years and thus utilizes more generic terms like ―the rayon
plant at Front Royal‖ unless specifically discussing the years when Avtex Fibers, Inc. owned the plant.
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military, which granted it a strong degree of protection from environmental
regulation for most of its operating life.
This paper examines the entwined histories of the Shenandoah River and
the rayon factory at Front Royal, especially the origins of its problematic waste
disposal practices, and focuses on the changing dynamics that ultimately gave
the health of the river—treated for so many years as a raw material and waste
receptacle—priority over the factory. This history provides a microcosm to
examine human interaction with the encompassing natural world, highlighting
the limits of human knowledge with regard to predicting environmental
consequences, the agency of environmental systems, and the possibilities for
checking the momentum of technological systems that harm the environment.

Figure 1. Map of the Shenandoah River Valley. The rayon plant at Front Royal was located in
Warren County, at the confluence of the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah River. Source:
United States Geological Survey, “Shenandoah Valley Research Publications,”
http://va.water.usgs.gov/bib/bib/words_shen.html
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Introduction
The South Fork of the Shenandoah River crooks a meandering arm
around 440 acres of floodplain in Front Royal, Virginia. For forty-nine years on
that piece of ground, the river supported a major manufacturing facility making
viscose rayon fiber for consumer and military use. The two entities—the river
and the factory—formed a single complex, a hybrid of technological and
environmental systems. The rayon produced at Front Royal profited the
community and played important roles globally, but the prodigious waste
products from rayon manufacturing polluted not only the river but also
groundwater, soil, and air. Despite halting attempts at environmental
reconciliation, the relationship between river and factory never obtained a
healthy reciprocity. As a fundamental component of the rayon plant‘s
operations and of many Shenandoah Valley communities, the South Fork‘s
place within the river-plant complex shifted as societal attitudes toward the
environment changed during the factory‘s operating life.
In the end, the hybrid relationship ended in a collision of circumstance
and changing values that paints a picture of human society both hopeful and
disturbing. Powerful environmental laws like the 1972 Clean Water Act and
1980 Superfund law made it increasingly expensive for the facility to pollute,
and eventually accumulated pressure from state, federal, and citizen groups led
to the plant‘s closure in 1989. As of 2010, remediation of the Avtex site under
the Superfund law continues, with plans to make the land a riverside park and
business zone.
Studying the history of rayon production at Front Royal provides both
literal and metaphorical insights. The plant and its relationship to the South
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Fork of the Shenandoah mirror a larger piece of the human experience, offering
an industrial metaphor for the problematic relationship many human societies
have with nature. The concept that people and nature are separate entities is
merely a trick of perception; as historian William Cronon puts it, ―all
people…share with each other and with all living and unliving things a single
earthly home which we identify as the abstraction called nature.‖2 Yet
conceptualizing the reality that humans are nature can be difficult. Being so
wholly dependent on and enmeshed in a vast living system limits our ability to
completely comprehend it. Sometimes the wider whole is best understood
through microcosm.
The rayon facility gives us such a view, demonstrating a specific example
of how human systems rely on broader ecological systems. The rayon factory
was a large, complex, technological system, invented and organized by people.
The South Fork of the Shenandoah River is one small part of the global
ecosystem and one segment of the Shenandoah River watershed, which
encompasses roughly 1.5 million acres.3 The process of manufacturing rayon
depended entirely on water supplied by the South Fork. If the river suddenly
went dry, the factory would immediately cease to function.
Sadly, the rayon plant‘s relationship to the river mimicked the common
response of many human societies to nature. While some individuals at the
plant made real effort to protect the river from toxic discharges, the overall
corporate attitude during the plant‘s operating life placed minimal importance

2

William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1991), 19.
3

Potomac Watershed Partnership, ―Shenandoah River,‖
http://www.potomacwatershed.net/ijourney/shenando/shenando.html (accessed February 14, 2010).
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on the health of aquatic life. The South Fork was a means to an end, an
industrial extractive resource. The companies that operated the plant over its
forty-nine year history followed components of federal and state environmental
laws to a minimal degree, often paying off fines rather than repairing problems.
Protection of the river ranked low on the operators‘ priority list, and military
demand for some of the plant‘s products further complicated the relationship.
In other words, the factory treated the river as we, societally, treat nature: a
resource to be used, a vague concept in the back of our minds—far below profit,
jobs, or family—that becomes a priority only when problems arise, such as
contaminated drinking water, fish kills, or a river turned rank and milky white.
The interaction between society and nature is most visible and concrete
in certain elements of the rayon plant‘s story, where the friction and disparity
within the river-plant complex becomes most evident. Chapter one explores the
histories possessed by each entity: the factory‘s genealogy of technology and
concomitant waste on the one hand, and the river‘s geological epic and
attendant human use on the other. Chapter two examines the important global
role played by the river-plant complex during World War II and the steep price
paid by the South Fork. During this era, the interests of the factory dominated;
the river was largely treated as an extractive resource and a static waste
receptacle.
The chapters three and four explain how rayon manufacturing creates
toxic wastes and examine the rayon plant‘s early attempts to deal with that
material. The fifth chapter considers the shift in dynamics between the river
and the factory following World War II as concerns about the South Fork and
the environment in general increased. For sport fishermen, the South Fork
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afforded a different kind of resource, one that required clean water and healthy
aquatic life. After the war, fishermen began to advocate on the river‘s behalf,
successfully lobbying for Virginia‘s first water quality law. The factory
managers‘ attempts to adjust to new regulatory oversight continued for the
remainder of the plant‘s operating life as the American response to
environmental problems shifted, producing stricter pollution control legislation.
The chapter also explores how regulation of toxics at the rayon plant displaced
some of the waste to locations where it continued to cause harm.
Shifting dynamics between river and factory took place in predictable
physical zones of interaction between plant and river, such as the wastewater
treatment plant and the land surrounding the factory. But they occurred
further afield as well—in courtrooms and negotiations with military officials, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Commonwealth of Virginia—
interactions that redefined the concept of the river, of hazardous waste, and of
harm. Chapter six discusses events in all of these arenas that finally halted the
technological momentum of the rayon plant, leading to its closure in 1989.
Throughout the factory‘s forty-nine years of operation, the number of
protections and advocates for the river increased, but its status as an
independent ecological system remained on the periphery for the companies
operating the plant, and even, it seems, for the regulatory bodies. Although
regulatory permitting and monitoring provided tools for protection, the burden
of proof remained on the river. Damage to it had to be quantifiable before
action could be taken. Problems below a certain, somewhat arbitrary, threshold
could be ignored. The power balance between technological and ecological
systems in the river-plant complex remained lop-sided, a result perhaps of a

5
technological momentum inscribed with the attitudes and design flaws that
initiated the waste problems at the Front Royal plant. This study concludes
with a discussion of how human actions can check technological momentum,
and how precautionary measures can provide healthy inertia to the momentum
of future technological systems.
The concept of technological momentum originates with historian
Thomas Hughes; his writings on technology provide important architecture and
vocabulary to this study. Hughes defines technological systems on a broad
scale, using large and complex entities, such as the U.S. electric grid, as his
examples. Nevertheless, his approach translates well for smaller units of
technology, including the rayon plant in Front Royal. Despite its self-contained
appearance, the technological system of this river-plant complex extended far
beyond the facility itself. The system included predictable components, such as
the physical infrastructure of the plant and the machines used to spin, wash,
and stretch rayon fibers. Transportation infrastructure, especially the railroad,
connected the factory to suppliers and purchasers.
But multiple additional entities were also part of the larger technological
system, including all three companies that owned and operated the rayon
facility, as well as banks that financed expansions, educational facilities that
trained employees, unions that represented workers, and more. Going further
afield, Hughes also suggests that technological systems include ―legislative
artifacts.‖4 At the Front Royal plant, state and federal laws regarding a broad
range of topics—from military procurement, labor issues, and taxes, to worker

4

Thomas P. Hughes, ―The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,‖ in The Social
Constructions of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed.
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 51.
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safety, environmental protection, and import-export restrictions—all shaped
decision-making by managers and workers throughout its operating life.
Finally, Hughes argues that natural resources, when ―they are socially
constructed and adapted to function in systems,… also qualify as system
artifacts.‖5 Viscose rayon production combined a variety of natural resources,
all of them transformed from their original state before arriving at the plant.
Cellulose from tree fiber was a primary ingredient for viscose. Made from
chipped and pulped softwood trees harvested in Alaska, Canada, and the Pacific
Northwest, the cellulose arrived at the factory already pressed into thick white
sheets resembling blotting paper.6 The production process also involved
multiple chemicals, synthesized off-site from various raw materials and
delivered to Front Royal via gas lines and railroad tank cars. Mining techniques
to dig the coal that powered on-site turbines intensified in environmental
impact during the rayon plant‘s lifetime, from deep mines to strip mines.
Limestone used in the wastewater treatment plant also had to be mined,
cleaned, and transported.
Charting the flow of materials and resources into the rayon plant paints
a miniature version of William Cronon‘s depiction of Chicago in Nature’s
Metropolis. The resources required to manufacture this one product shaped
landscapes across the U.S., each linked to Front Royal and the rayon market by
miles of railroad track. Like the meat packing plants in 19th century Chicago,
behind the Front Royal factory and the skeins of rayon it produced ―were the
5

6

Ibid.

American Viscose Division/Fiber Operation, ―Welcome to FMC-Front Royal,‖ Pamphlet, Avtex
Collection, Local #371T Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union Papers (Union Papers); Laura
V. Hale Archives. Warren County Heritage Society. Front Royal, VA (WHS).
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ghost landscapes that had given it birth.‖7 Perhaps the most haunting
landscape was that immediately surrounding the rayon facility. Like the
Chicago factories, the rayon plant could not adequately process or safely
dispose of its byproducts and waste. The nearby land and river bore the brunt
of this excess.
Of all the natural resources that supplied the rayon plant, the water of
the South Fork was the least processed and the least transformed.8 The rayon
plant required a river; it could not have functioned away from a consistent
water source. Thus, river water did not require long-distance transport and
needed only modest treatment for use in the plant and power house. It was a
truly raw material, not requiring chemical synthesis, mining, logging, pulping,
pressing, or shipment across the nation. Unique among the other natural
resources used at the factory, the river‘s water also played a dual role as a
resource for extraction and receptacle for waste. Thus, the river was not just a
raw material, it was also a place—what historian Joel Tarr calls a ―sink,‖ where
wastes can be ―disposed of in the cheapest and most convenient way possible.‖9
Transactions between the river-plant hybrid occurred within a physical zone of
overlap, a space where the river was simultaneously adapted to the functions of
the plant while still functioning as part of a larger ecosystem.

7

Cronon, 263.

8

It appears Avtex filtered the river water and used rock salt as a water softener. See Susan Groves
and Frank Settle, ―The Avtex Saga: National Security versus Environmental Protection,‖ Journal of
Chemical Education 79, no. 6 (June 2002), 686; and Richard K. Daniels, ―Avtex Fibers Rayon Plant,‖
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/ homepages/rdaniels2/layout2.htm (accessed May 8, 2009). Note that this
CompuServe server shut down on July 6, 2009.
9

Joel A. Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Pollution in Historical Perspective
(Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 1996), 385.
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Hughes identifies a powerful force that helps to clarify the reasons
behind the factory‘s dominance of the river-plant complex for most of its
operating life: the momentum of technological systems. Using the language of
physics, he ascribes mass to the organizational elements of a technological
system, direction to the goals of a system, and velocity to its growth rate. As a
result, ―mature systems have a quality that is analogous… to inertia of
motion.‖10 This helps to explain the factory‘s longevity in spite of the pollutants
the plant discharged into the river even as social values shifted to emphasize
the importance of environmental protection. The technological system that
both incorporated and emanated from rayon production created multiple
buffers, as the company provided jobs, tax revenue, political contributions, and
so on. The most powerful buffer, however, came from military interests.
During its forty-nine year operating life, the Front Royal facility
manufactured two militarily critical products: high tenacity rayon tire cord for
World War II operations and carbonizable rayon for missiles and other
aerospace purposes during the Cold War years. The momentum acquired from
this component of rayon‘s technological system single-handedly kept the plant
in operation in its final years. The socially constructed dichotomy between
national security and environmental concern multiplied the difficulty of
effectively regulating the plant‘s pollution. The military rayon products webbed
the factory and the Front Royal community into the global technological system
of weapons manufacturing, from tank tires during World War II to nuclear
warheads carried on missiles built with Front Royal rayon. Environmental

10

Huges, ―The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,‖ 77.
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protection, therefore faced vastly amplified obstacles due to the ―conservative
momentum of the military-industrial-complex‖11 and its global implications.
Part of Hughes‘ explanation for this contributes another valuable concept
to this study. The momentum of technological systems includes social
influences from the times in which they originated; these values, attitudes, and
intentions also have a different kind of ―inertia, [that of] conservative
momentum.‖12 Likewise, the physical components of a system ―project into the
future the socially constructed characteristics acquired in the past when they
were designed.‖13 Hughes theorizes that characteristics adapted to the social
values of a certain time period continue into the present due to technological
momentum. By the late 1980s, the factory carried with it, in the decaying
buildings and chemical waste disposal system, not just the basic
manufacturing infrastructure of the 1930s (and before) but also the values and
expectations of those times. More significantly, it carried internal bureaucratic
expectations from its earliest years of operation—World War II and immediately
after—when chemistry and industry had won the war and operated within an
environment of patriotic enthusiasm and self-regulation. Cold War values
emphasizing military preparedness and massive weapons systems reinforced
these technological learned behaviors.
Hughes has suggested that only counter-momentum of equal force could
change the imperative of such massive systems of values, goals, expectations,

11

Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm,
1870-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 460.
12

Hughes, American Genesis, 459.

13

Hughes, ―The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,‖ 77.
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and military demand.14 But the technological system of rayon production in
Front Royal broke down not because of a unified counter-momentum, but due
to a slipshod collection of cumulative but highly-contingent events. Within that
process are the stories of multiple smaller counterforces, growing over the same
decades, nudging at the plant‘s managers to address its pollution problems.
Many entities within the rayon plant‘s technological system—particularly state
regulatory agencies and politicians—initially helped to facilitate the plant‘s
continued operations, but then, in the final days, shifted sides to respond to
other forces, other socially constructed values of newer times.
In one sense, the multiple forces countering rayon production‘s
momentum at Front Royal plant did have a degree of unity, in that they
coalesced around the question of the river. The river was the bellwether and
whistleblower; it clanged the alarm bell and provided the data to quantify the
toxic discharges of the factory, its unhealthy human-built appendage. For the
most part, the people who responded on the river‘s behalf did so seeking some
kind of ―extractive‖ or consumptive gain, based in personal desire, political
expediency, economic interest, or some combination of these. For some, the
situation at the rayon plant replicated a trend that grew out of the technological
explosion following World War II. Historian Adam Rome explains that some
Americans began to see ―the new machinery of production as a threat to the
new dream of consumption.‖15 Along the Shenandoah, these new dreams

14

For example, in American Genesis, Hughes theorizes that ―in order to bring about a substantial
change in the motion and direction of massive systems of production… a counterforce of comparable
magnitude becomes imperative,‖ 461-462.
15

Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American
Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5.
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embraced such things as sport fishing and other recreational activities, and
enjoyment of the river‘s aesthetic values as tourists or landowners. Such
connections between human desires and a healthy natural world are crucial
components for stirring environmental protection, but there remains another
side of the river: a space where it escapes the embrace of human desire or
social construction and exists unto itself, feeding a far broader range of life than
just the human species.
Alongside the socially constructed idea of the river and its extractive
uses, the biological reality of the river exists with its own complicated causes
and effects, its own balance and dynamism. Many voices have spoken to this
dualism. Richard White, for example, concluded from his study of the
Columbia River that ―no matter how much we have created many of its spaces
and altered its behavior, [the river] is still tied to larger organic cycles beyond
our control… the river has purposes of its own which do not readily yield to
desires to maximize profit.‖16 In her paradigm-shifting 1962 book, Silent Spring,
Rachel Carson reflected upon this fluidity, writing ―seldom if ever does Nature
operate in closed and separate compartments, and she has not done so in
distributing the earth‘s water supply.‖17 The South Fork of the Shenandoah
and its ecological system carry a physical momentum of their own, interwoven
with the human-built world and also existing beyond it. The momentum of the
river, like nature itself, is what humans too often fail to grasp, for it is diffuse,

16

Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1995), 112.
17

Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1962), 47.
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connected in wider and more intricate ways than we are usually conditioned to
detect.
The science of ecology provides terms that help convey something of this
complexity and of the river‘s existence in a context that subsumes the humanbuilt world. The term ―ecology‖ is relatively new to our lexicon, coined in 1873
to describe the study of interactions between plants, animals, and their
habitats.18 An ecological system, or ecosystem, may refer to these organisms
and interactions in a specific area, or something larger: the planetary
ecosystem. Other terms express both the immensity and limits of natural
systems. The definition of the ―biosphere,‖ another late 19the century term, is
―the global sum of all ecosystems,‖ and ―the thin layer near earth‘s surface that
contains all known life.‖19 Our poet-scientists name these phenomena in
language that speaks to our senses. Rachel Carson writes, ―Water, soil, and the
earth‘s green mantle of plants make up the world that supports the animal life
of the earth,‖20 and the land, Aldo Leopold adds, ―is a fountain of energy flowing
through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals.‖21
Even in a relatively contained ecosystem like the Shenandoah River, the
process of cataloging the organisms and interactions that drive this fountain of
energy is an immense task. On the broad scale, the ecosystem embraces the
river‘s watershed: all the river‘s surface and ground water tributaries, all the
18

―Ecology,‖ Etymology Dictionary Online, http://www.etymonline.com/ (accessed February 21,
2010); and T.F. Hoad, ―ecology,‖ The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, 1996,
Encyclopedia.com (February 21, 2010).
19

Gretchen C. Daily, ed. Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997), 2, 4.
20

21

Carson, 64;

Aldo Leopold, A Sand County almanac: with essays on conservation from Round River (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1970), 253.
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soil and plants that filter rainwater. Indeed, everything that exists within the
watershed is part of the watershed, including roads and houses. On the
opposite end of the scale are microscopic organisms—bacteria and molecules of
oxygen and nitrogen, and the benthic macroinvertebrates—mayflies and
mussels and many species in between—that live on the river bottom, feeding on
fallen leaves and other organic matter.22 Multiple species of fish feed on the
macroinvertebrates and on each other. Then there are creatures, from birds to
bears, who feed on the fish, as well as all manner of plant life that relies on the
river. Humans are also in the mix, of course, many of us never considering that
we live within a watershed and that our daily choices may directly impact the
Shenandoah River ecosystem. The river simultaneously includes us and exists
beyond us, with its own purposes. Understanding what happened at the rayon
plant in Front Royal requires consideration of the history and momentum of
both the river and the plant.

22

Environmental Protection Agency, ―Benthic Macroinvertebrates in Our Waters,‖ Biological
Indicators of Watershed Health, http://www.epa.gov/bioiweb1/html/benthosclean.html (accessed February
21, 2010).

Chapter 1
Origins of the River and the Factory

The history of the Shenandoah River begins far beyond human
constructs, deep in the bedrock of geologic time. The river is part of an ancient
landscape of oceans, volcanoes, and vast tectonic shifts. The very oldest
exposed rocks in the Blue Ridge Mountains formed roughly 1.2 billion years
ago. A shallow ocean covered what is now the Shenandoah Valley and the
eastern U.S. for roughly 400 million years, laying down sediment and sea shells
that compacted into layers of shales and limestones. The sea began to recede
about 350 million years ago, leaving swamps and meandering rivers in its wake.
Another vast shift came 275 million years ago when the continents of Africa and
North America collided, folding and breaking and shoving the flat sedimentary
rocks, building the mountains that surround the Shenandoah Valley over the
course of the next several million years.23
With the formation of the Appalachians, and for the recent 240 million
years, erosion has shaped, formed, and reformed the limestone, sandstone,
granite, and greenstone rocks into the mountains and valleys of today. The
Shenandoah River does not have a birthdate because it is part of all the
geological processes that shaped the landscape. Many of its tributaries flow
underground, through fissures in limestone laid down during the era of the
great shallow inland sea. The river‘s curves, depths, and shallows conform to
rock types configured by mountain building, curling around ridges that resist
23

W. Cullen Sherwood, ―A Brief Geologic History of Rockingham County,‖ Department of
Geology and Environmental Studies, James Madison University, http://csmres.jmu.edu/geollab/vageol/
outreach/fieldtrips/ rockingham/whole.html (accessed February 21, 2010).
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erosion and carving down through softer rocks.24 The Shenandoah River and
its tributaries shape every natural feature of the landscape. From ground level,
the river‘s influence may be only marginally apparent, but viewed from above,
ecological and landscape patterns become more evident, and ―stream valleys are
seen to dominate‖ the land.25
The river has a ecological history outside of human influence, based in
geological change, weather events—including droughts and floods—as well as
the interplay of organisms within the river and surrounding it. Yet human
activities have played a drastic and dramatic role in the river‘s history. The
earliest evidence of human interaction with the river dates back over 11,000
years when paleo-indians camped, hunted, and quarried stones for arrowheads
along the South Fork. Archeological digs near Front Royal uncovered post
holes from what may be the oldest structures in North America.26 In 1699,
John Lederer crossed the Blue Ridge at Manassas Gap near Front Royal,
becoming the first documented European explorer to view the Shenandoah
Valley. From then on, the river and its landscape gained names inscribed in
written histories.
These now familiar names mark out the geography of the Shenandoah
River system. Beginning in the upper reaches of Virginia‘s two great mountain
ranges, the Blue Ridge and Allegheny, the river‘s watershed runs roughly 150
miles from south of Waynesboro to the confluence with the Potomac River at
24
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Harpers Ferry. The major tributaries are all directional in name. The South
Fork has roots in both mountain ranges: Blue Ridge streams collect into the
South River, and the North and Middle Rivers originate in the folded eastern
front of the Allegheny Mountains. The three converge near Port Republic,
becoming the South Fork of the Shenandoah. The river curves northward,
continuously carving the Page Valley between the erosion-resistant granites in
the Blue Ridge and sandstones in Massanutten mountain.27 Meanwhile, the
North Fork draws a fan of tributaries down from the Alleghenies and weaves
them into deep ox bows that skirt the western side of Massanutten. The two
undulating forks finally meet to form the main stem of the Shenandoah River a
scant two miles downstream of the now-closed rayon plant site.

Figure 2. Flooding at the confluence of the North and South Rivers at Port Republic. Photo by the
author.
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In 1937, American Viscose Corporation purchased 440 acres of land
beside the South Fork of the Shenandoah in Front Royal, Virginia to build its
largest rayon plant. At first thought, a hulking industrial plant on the banks of
the Shenandoah may seem somehow incongruous. The Shenandoah River and
the valley it carved are fabled places in America, the lyrical name woven into
folk songs and images from a history that borders on legend: the Knights of the
Golden Horseshoe expedition getting drunk on the river bank in 1716, a young
George Washington hard at work surveying the valley, the famed breadbasket of
the Confederacy in flames during the Civil War. The name Shenandoah also
belongs to a nearby national park, evoking forests garlanded with autumn
colors, a beautiful land. Upon seeing the Alleghenies on the far side of the
valley for the first time, John Lederer wrote that he ―could hardly discern
whether they were mountains or clouds.‖28 Perhaps they were both. There is
truth in the romantic visions; the Valley, mountains, and river are the United
States of America‘s original frontier, and they are lovely, inspiring the poetic
imagination. But the Shenandoah River has been put to work by humans for
centuries. It shares the encroachments and aquatic tragedies of any industrial
river.
Humans have used the broad, flat Shenandoah Valley as a thoroughfare
for millennia. Many major modern day roads follow long-distance Native
American trails. One of these, now called the Valley Pike or Route 11, runs
roughly north and south through the Valley. Multiple east-west trails are now
also paved, passing through wind and water gaps in the mountains. Geography
made the Front Royal area a crossroads for human travel early on. The
28
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Manassas and Chester Gaps in the Blue Ridge allowed travelers to approach
from the east. The Valley Pike and both forks of the Shenandoah River lay just
to the west. This confluence of transport combined with a hydrological
situation to make Front Royal an early center of trade. At a curve in the river
near the present day Avtex site, the water slows down, depositing alluvial
sediment, eroded off the mountains and valley.29 The resulting shallows, called
―The Flats,‖ were an easy and convenient spot to pull canoes, and later barges,
ashore. Native Americans built a fish weir near the site and gathered there to
fish, process fish, and trade. Cleanup efforts at the Avtex site in the 1990s and
2000s uncovered numerous arrowheads and other Native American artifacts.
During colonial times, European settlers in the Shenandoah Valley
produced crops and other resources for trade within the colonies and export to
England, including timber, iron, hemp, grain, and flour. The river powered
grain mills and iron furnaces and served as the main avenue for trade. Port
Republic and Bridgewater (originally called Bridgeport) were loading points for
transport of goods heading downstream on the South and North Forks of the
Shenandoah. Settlers shipped their goods to market by gundalows, flatbottomed barges that were poled downstream and then dismantled; the crew
sold the wood then walked back home. The Flats again became a destination
where gundalow drivers would empty their cargo into the carts of merchants
who transported the goods through Manassas Gap to eastern markets at
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Alexandria and Dumphries. The Flats remained a transfer point when the
railroad came to Front Royal in 1854.30
After the Revolutionary War, the Shenandoah River and its Valley
continued as key resource caches for trade and consumption. For example, the
Patowmack Company formed in 1785 with support from George Washington; in
an effort to make the Shenandoah more navigable, the company dredged the
river bottom and blasted rock to widen the river‘s channel. The company also
built V-shaped dams in shallow parts of the river. An opening in the center of
the dam increased flow, allowing easier passage for barges.31 Human
manipulation of the river for commercial purposes increased in intensity over
time. The twentieth century brought heavier industry to the river and its
tributaries. Beginning in 1922, Wampler Foods initiated industrial poultry
production in Rockingham County. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
purchased land beside the South River in Waynesboro, relying on river water to
manufacture acetate rayon beginning in 1929.32 In addition, communities
along the river used the South Fork and its tributaries for both drinking water
and disposal of contaminants, such as sewage and industrial discharges.33
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When the American Viscose facility opened in 1940, people had used, polluted,
and relied on the Shenandoah for centuries.
When American Viscose Corporation employees scouted the 440 acre site
on the banks of the South Fork in 1937, they were operating in familiar
territory. Twenty years earlier in Roanoke, Virginia, the company opened what
was at that time the largest rayon plant in the world.34 The rayon industry as a
whole had a heavy presence in the state. By 1941, American Viscose plants in
Roanoke and Front Royal and an Industrial Rayon Corporation factory in
Covington manufactured viscose rayon; Celanese Corporation of America near
Narrows produced an acetate rayon yarn; and E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
with plants in Waynesboro, Ampthill, and Martinsville, manufactured both
acetate and viscose rayon fibers, as well as cellophane.35 In the late 1940s
through the mid-50s, ―value added‖ for synthetic fibers production in Virginia
was second only to tobacco.36
These industries connected into a larger technological system during the
early twentieth century in which southern state governments offered economic
incentives to support industrial expansion in their states. Virginia as a whole
had quantities of ―cheap and radical-free labor,‖ as well as ―lenient industrial
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relations policies.‖37 Front Royal‘s Town Manager, L.B. Dutrow, told a reporter
in 1938, ―We were told that the representatives [of American Viscose] also had
been looking over a site in North Carolina, but that they liked the Virginia tax
laws better.‖ He noted that they expressed particular interest in the location of
the 440 acres: about three-quarters of a mile outside of town (at that time) and
adjacent to both the railroad and the river.38 Alongside direct financial
supports for their industrial endeavors, many southern states offered
companies virtually free reign with regard to natural resources.39 Water was
one of the key extractive resources that southern40 states could offer.
Oftentimes, industries selected rural sites where water and other raw materials
were abundant and chemical discharges into air, land, and water would attract
less notice. The Front Royal site, located in a rural region and in close
proximity to the South Fork, offered American Viscose all these benefits, along
37
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with a solid transportation infrastructure, tax incentives, cooperative labor, and
a business-friendly political climate. More than anything else, however,
American Viscose wanted the river.
Rayon manufacturing uses massive quantities of water. Current
production methods require 175 gallons of treated water to produce one pound
of rayon. Producing two million pounds of rayon annually required one million
gallons of treated water per day.41 The Front Royal plant opened in 1940 (see
fig. 3) designed to produce 75 million pounds of rayon per year,42 thus
requiring—at full capacity—daily water input of somewhere in the ballpark of
37.5 million gallons. The manufacturing process required water to dissolve
caustic soda to break down cellulose; water in large quantities washed rayon
threads and diluted chemicals; it cleaned waste materials out of the plant and
joined forces with coal to power the facility‘s steam turbines. Water treatment
procedures, used at various times over the plant‘s operating life, also required
additional amounts of water. Thus, in actuality, total water use in the early
1940s may have been quite a bit higher than 38 million gallons per day.
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Figure 3. The Front Royal rayon plant in 1943, under the ownership of American Viscose
Corporation. Courtesy of Warren Heritage Society.

Understanding the origins of the product manufactured at the rayon
plant—viscose rayon—illuminates the depth of the facility‘s reliance on the
river. The story began in the distant past at an unlikely crossroads: the
intersection of human desire for status, comfort and luxury with the
reproductive strategy of a species of grey moth, Bombyx mori, the silk worm.
The moth‘s larvae ate white mulberry leaves and spun out a fine thread to
weave cocoons. Silk making interrupted this process by boiling the cocoons
and caterpillars, then unwinding the fine threads and twisting them into thicker
strands for weaving. The ancient practice of silk production began in China
thousands of years ago, and as a rare and exotic fabric, silk was favored among
the wealthy across the Middle East and Europe. From early on, rulers sought
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to develop silk industries in their own countries or to control production
abroad. Some scientists tried another avenue toward textile dominance:
creating man-made, silk-like fibers. In the early 1800s, an epidemic disease
fatal to silkworms decimated the European sericulture industry43 and further
stimulated interest in creating a synthetic substitute.
English scientist Dr. Robert Hooke first proposed the general method for
manufacturing rayon. In a 1664 book titled Micrographia, he wrote:
I have often thought that probably there might be a way found
out, to make an artificial glutinous composition, much resembling,
if not full as good, nay better, than that excrement, or whatever
other substance it be out of which the silkworm wire-draws his
clew. If such a composition were found, it were certainly an easy
matter to find very quick ways of drawing it out into small wires
for use. 44
Decades later, in the 1740s, French scientist René de Réaumur, who might
today be titled an entomologist, published Mémoirs pour Servir à l’Historie des
Insects in which he considered the possibility of threads made of chemical
varnish that would resemble silk in ―brilliancy and strength.‖45
Scientists working in the 19th century sought to mimic the glutinous
―excrement‖ of the silkworm by dissolving various types of fiber in various
chemicals. The chemists who made the most progress were in search of light
bulb filaments, not textiles. An English chemist named Sir Joseph Wilson
Swan—most famous for his invention of the incandescent light bulb—dissolved
nitrocellulose in acetic acid, then forced it though a small hole into a
43
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coagulating bath of alcohol. The fibers produced were not only effective for
filaments; they were also considered the first artificial silk. Using this
procedure as a starting point, various chemists sought to perfect the process.
Count Hilaire de Bernigaud de Chardonnet had the first commercial success in
1885, followed by a German company in 1899.46
The viscose method for producing rayon emerged in Britain in the late
1800s, eventually becoming the industry standard. Charles Cross, Edward
Bevan, and Clayton Beadle devised and patented the first viscose in 1892. They
treated cellulose from tree fiber with sodium hydroxide—a strongly alkaline
substance commonly known as caustic soda or lye—in order to ―swell the fiber‖
and create a thick solution. The resulting substance was dissolved with carbon
disulfide, creating a ―thick, straw-colored solution having the viscose
consistency of honey or molasses.‖47 The three men patented this viscoseproduction process, but it took two additional inventors to perfect a procedure
for spinning viable viscose thread.
Englishman Charles Stearn headed the Zurich Incandescence Lamp
Company in London, but Charles Topham, his assistant, was the real
innovator. They experimented, unsuccessfully at first, by extruding the viscose
substance through a spinneret and into an acid bath for hardening. Initially,
the fibers were too weak to spin, but Topham discovered that aging the viscose
before extruding and spinning created viable fibers.48 Topham also invented a
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pump to regulate the flow of viscose to the spinnerets, as well as a spinning box
that caught the rayon filaments, wound them into yarn, and collected them into
a ―cake.‖49 These same products and procedures became key to the
technological system comprising the rayon industry. Machines based on
Topham‘s model and reproduced on a mass scale were in use at the Front Royal
plant when it closed in 1989.
Just as the invention of viscose rayon proceeded by trial and error, so too
did the industry itself. The American Viscose Corporation (AVC), owner of the
Front Royal plant from 1938-1963, originated as a subsidiary of the Courtaulds
family‘s dynasty in the British textile business. Courtaulds held the first patent
on the British process for making viscose rayon and for years dominated the
market in viscose fabric both at home and in the U.S.50 However, for several
years after obtaining the patent, Courtaulds‘ ability to manufacture
commercial-grade viscose rayon was by no means certain. Developing a largescale commercially successful viscose rayon industry had a multidirectional
character. 51 Like the process of invention and experimentation used by
Topham, Stern, and others before them to develop viscose rayon, Courtaulds
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met failures and dead-ends that shaped decisions and technological
developments.
In 1782, George Courtauld initiated the family‘s association with fabric
production when he set up a business in London as a silk-throwster, twisting
threads of raw silk to make them suitable for weaving. His son built a silk mill
in 1816 that became extremely profitable manufacturing crêpe silk, a popular
material for mourning clothes in the Victorian era. The Courtaulds‘
involvement with viscose rayon production commenced in 1904 when the
company purchased British patent rights for the manufacture of textile yarn
using Topham and Stern‘s viscose method.
Although the discovery of ―artificial silk‖52 was several years old at that
time, no company had successfully fabricated commercial quantities. Indeed,
several had attempted to do so using the Topham and Stern method but found
the process unreliable. Courtaulds, Ltd. too struggled with multiple problems.
Production of useable quantities fluctuated wildly, and yarns tended to be
flammable or explosive if not properly processed. Often threads were
excessively hard and would neither cohere nor dye evenly. A Courtaulds
manager complained of viscose rayon in 1906: ―the material is no use for
weaving.‖ They could not produce top grade product, nor find a market for the
material. Between 1905 and 1907, Courtaulds‘ first rayon plant, located in
Coventry, England, turned no profit. The company‘s focus instead turned to
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research, attempting to reinvent the Stearn and Topham method to allow for
commercial production. 53
Courtaulds‘ experimentation proved the need to refine and adjust almost
every component of Stearn and Topham‘s viscose rayon process. Determining
the proper composition of the chemical spinning bath proved to be the greatest
challenge.54 A patent dispute exacerbated the problem by hampering the
company‘s ability to experiment with certain chemical combinations. However,
in 1907, one of Courtaulds‘ in-house chemists discovered that adding glucose
to a spinning bath of sulphuric acid created an attractive and flexible spun
yarn. Problems with creating consistently high-quality material persisted until
company chemists found that combining zinc sulphate with the acid bath led to
more uniform production and made ―a remarkable difference to the quantity,
feel, and appearance of the viscose threads.‖55
During this time period, Courtaulds‘ scientists also struggled to find a
dependable procedure to generate high quality viscose to the supply the plant.
Minor discrepancies caused major problems: ―variations in wood-pulp,
variations in the conditions of steeping, variations in temperature, variations in
ageing: all were capable of producing a viscose virtually incapable of being spun
into yarn.‖ A marked decline in top quality yarn in the spring of 1909 was
traced to excavations for new construction at the Courtaulds‘ facility. These
disturbances caused a slight drop in temperature in the factory cellars used for
53
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storing viscose. Though the viscose could be spun, the small temperature
variance made the finished product low grade. Through such ―zig-zag‖
patterns, Courtaulds‘ chemists pieced together a picture of the conditions
required to produce top quality viscose for a high quality yarn. 56
Between 1905 and 1913, the years of experimentation and
consolidation, rayon became Courtaulds‘ core product, with profits outstripping
those from silk and other fabrics. For the most part, the company now
manufactured yarns for sale to textile companies rather than fabrics for
consumers. Courtaulds‘ engineers, who designed looms and mills for weaving
silk, continued to play an important role in the company, but rayon
manufacturing placed company chemists in a central position. The Coventry
plant had its own laboratory in which experimentation on spinning baths and
viscose occurred. Consolidation of the viscose manufacturing process and its
reliance on rigorous control of chemical processes resulted in expansion of the
size and staff of Courtaulds‘ laboratories. Rayon and the technology required to
produce it transformed Courtaulds from ―a textile firm into a chemical firm with
a textile branch.‖57
Courtaulds initially sold much of their rayon material for decorative
braid, embroidery thread, ties, scarves, and pom-poms to decorate children‘s
hats.58 With growing market success in Britain, the company began to explore
purchase of U.S. patent rights on viscose rayon production in 1907. Another
56
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series of fits and starts occurred over the next three years as the company
negotiated purchase of patent rights, located land and labor for a new factory,
and assembled a management team in the U.S. The company‘s efforts gained
urgency with word of a proposed new tariff act (passed in 1909) in the U.S.
Congress that would raise duties on imported artificial silk by 30% or more. If
Courtaulds could ―get in behind the tariff wall,‖ as sole owners of the U.S.
patent, the company would have essentially no competition in the States until
the last of their patent rights expired in 1921.59 The company purchased land
on the Delaware River in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania and, in 1910,
incorporated the American Viscose Company (also known as Avisco or AVC).60
By 1915, AVC was tremendously profitable, surpassing the rayon output
of Courtaulds.61 Initially, most of the product continued to be used for
decorative fibers as well as knit goods, particularly men‘s socks. Rayon‘s mass
popularity in the U.S., however, began with women‘s stockings. At the end of
World War I when shorter, knee-length skirts became the fashion, sheer rayon
stockings sold for about a dollar a pair—in contrast to five dollars a pair for
silk—earning rayon the moniker ―the middle-class woman‘s silk.‖ 62 A historian
of rayon quipped that ―it was on the trim legs of the post-war flappers… that
rayon first stepped out into big business.‖63 With business booming, American
Viscose continued to expand, building six additional factories, each located on a
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major river: Roanoke, Virginia (1916) on the Roanoke River; Lewistown,
Pennsylvania (1920) on the Juniata River; Parkersburg, West Virginia (1926) on
the Little Kanawha River; Meadville, Pennsylvania (1928) on French Creek (a
major tributary of the Allegheny River); Nitro, West Virginia (1936) on the
Kanawha River; and Front Royal, Virginia (1937) on the South Fork of the
Shenandoah (see fig. 3). By the time the American Viscose plant opened in
Front Royal, Courtaulds and American Viscose had succeeded in building a
new industry with powerful technological momentum. Although AVC lost its
monopoly on the viscose rayon process in 1921 and had to compete with other
manufacturers, the company remained the largest rayon producer in the U.S.

Figure 4. Locations of American Viscose plants along major river systems, circa 1937. Source:
Coleman, Volume II, Rayon, 290.

Chapter 2
World War II Production and Momentum

By 1939, massive disruptions caused by war in Europe changed the field
on which business and consumer transactions occurred. For Courtaulds, this
led to an event that ―marked the end of an era‖ in the history of the company.64
Yet while Courtaulds‘ circumstances changed dramatically with the outbreak of
World War II, the momentum of the rayon manufacturing technological system
itself continued unscathed and, in fact, intensified.
In wartime, boundaries between industry, politics, and national interests
become increasingly fluid. The mixture of Britain‘s dire need for military
supplies, isolationist pressures in the United States, and American economic
opportunism created a gap big enough for AVC to slip away from Courtaulds.
The American Viscose Corporation‘s first major role on the global stage was not
directly related to the products it manufactured, but to its status as a Britishowned corporation. In March 1941, as Britain struggled with shortages of
military supplies, the company stood suddenly center-stage in the political
theater; with seven factories and eighteen thousand employees, American
Viscose was Britain‘s most valuable industrial holding in the United States.65
President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s administration walked a fine line in the
months leading up to March of 1941. As other European nations fell rapidly
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under Nazi control, the United Kingdom fought for survival, financially
strapped, and in dire need of supplies. Many factors tempered Roosevelt‘s
ability to provide material support to Britain. The four Neutrality Acts, passed
in the wake of World War I to keep the U.S. out of foreign conflicts, limited U.S.
ability to declare war, make cash loans, or provide supplies to combatants on
either side of a conflict. With strong isolationist and anti-British sentiment in
Congress and the nation, and the presidential election looming in November of
1940, the Roosevelt administration used creative methods to aid the British.
For example, in 1940, Roosevelt declared large quantities of munitions
―surplus‖ and shipped them off to England. However, to retain good public
opinion, the administration believed that it was critical for the U.S. receive
something in return for military supplies sent to the U.K. Britain purchased
some materials under Roosevelt‘s ―cash and carry‖ policy that allowed sale of
military goods to combatants but required them to pay for and transport the
goods immediately. In September of 1940, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill agreed to swap ninety-nine year leases on eight British colonial
islands ―for the establishment of naval and air bases‖ in exchange for fifty
―surplus‖ U.S. Navy destroyers. Churchill‘s correspondence with Roosevelt,
however, clearly demonstrates that the fifty destroyers were not nearly enough;
the British need for military supplies remained dire.66
Following his re-election in November, President Roosevelt began to
aggressively pursue means to aid the U.K. His friend and Treasury Secretary,
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Henry Morgenthau, Jr., recorded in his voluminous diaries Roosevelt‘s
explanation of his proposal:
It seems to me that the thing to do is to get away from the dollar
sign… I don‘t want to put the thing in terms of dollars or loans,
and I think the thing to do is to say that we will manufacture
what we need, …increase our productivity, and then we will say to
England, we will give you the guns and ships that you need,
provided that when the war is over you will return to us in kind
the guns and the ships that we have loaned to you… 67
This approach would not require repeal of the Neutrality Acts, since this was
not a cash loan or an outright gift to Britain. To the press, Roosevelt declared
that Britain fighting Germany was analogous to a neighbor trying to put out a
house fire. Rather than demand payment in the midst of the crisis, ―certainly,
he said, you would lend your garden hose to your neighbor and worry about
repayment later.‖68
The President continued to press forth aggressively and eloquently in
support of this plan, delivering his famous ―arsenal of democracy‖ fireside chat
on December 29, 1940. The blistering speech hammered home the
vulnerability of the U.S. to hostile powers and the critical role played by Britain
as the ―spearhead of resistance to world conquest.‖ Roosevelt also called on
industrialists and labor to increase military production to defend the U.S. and
support the Allies: ―all our present efforts are not enough. We must have more
ships, more guns, more planes—more of everything.‖69
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Behind the scenes, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his
staff worked to put Roosevelt‘s ideas into legislative form, drafting the future
Lend-Lease Act. The bill gave the President broad powers to apportion supplies
and decide which countries could receive defense resources. It also left open
the question of precisely how countries would repay the loans and leases at
war‘s end.70 Morgenthau was deeply involved, not only in crafting of the bill,
but also in the political maneuverings to get it passed in Congress. As part of
this effort, he pushed persistently for the British to demonstrate their
commitment to reciprocity in lend-lease.
Many in Congress and the American public were skeptical that Britain
could not afford to purchase U.S. military supplies outright. People theorized
that England was secreting away billions in gold and other assets in their
colonies around the world and trying to hoodwink the U.S. into ―financing
Britain‘s war.‖71 Because of this concern, much of Morgenthau‘s Congressional
testimony on the Lend-Lease Bill in January 1941 focused on demonstrating
the financial need of the British Empire. His tables of expenditures and
receipts showed that ―British gold resources, holdings of American securities,
and investments in the United States and elsewhere in the world, even if
entirely liquidated, could not meet [Britain‘s] deficit.‖72
Despite these numbers, the Roosevelt administration remained of the
opinion that Britain should reassure Congress and the American public of its
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financial need and commitment by selling off some of its assets in the United
States. Conversations between Secretary Morgenthau and his British
counterpart on this subject had started as early as July of 1940. Pressure on
the British increased in December with the announcement of Lend-Lease. As
part of Morgenthau‘s Lend-Lease testimony in January 1941 before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, he conveyed the promise of a U.K. Treasury official
that the British would sell some of their major assets in the United States ―as
rapidly as possible.‖73
Still the British stalled, scrambling to find other options rather than sell
their American investments, which Churchill described as ―of a special
character… the result of decades of healthy competitive effort.‖ As the U.S.
Congressional debates on Lend-Lease continued into March of 1941,
Morgenthau grew impatient with the British officials, stating that he had staked
his reputation before Congress on what appeared to be a falsehood. On March
10th, the day before Roosevelt signed Lend-Lease into law, Morgenthau stopped
by the home of Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the U.S., to apply some
personal pressure. Morgenthau explained that the President would be
requesting an appropriation to fund Lend-Lease in a few days and needed to see
movement on the U.K.‘s promise in order to win Congressional support. His
message got through: around midnight on the 10th, British treasury officials
exchanged a message ―to the effect that some very large company would have to
be sold very quickly.‖74
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President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act on Tuesday, March 11th,
1941 and immediately requested a 7 billion dollar appropriation from Congress
to fund the program.75 With Roosevelt‘s backing, Morgenthau set a deadline for
the British to complete a sale: March 15th, the following Saturday. American
Viscose, Britain‘s largest and most valuable industrial holding in the U.S., was
selected.76 Using wartime powers, the U.K. Treasury took over AVC‘s assets
and approached potential outright buyers, including Du Pont, another major
rayon manufacturer. Anti-trust laws prevented them from acquiring American
Viscose, and no other single buyer emerged. The British officials then went to
Morgan Stanley & Co. and Dillon, Read & Co., banking firms with whom the
British had an existing relationship, to arrange a sale to a syndicate of
American bankers.77 British officials signed the sale agreement on Sunday,
March 16th; the Senate approved the Lend-Lease appropriation on March 24th.
As it turned out, American Viscose was the only major British asset sold
to U.S. interests; in future transactions, Britain was able to obtain loans using
their American holdings as collateral. Unfortunately, due to the unusual
circumstances of the sale, Britain received far less for American Viscose than
the estimated value of the company. Although valued at over $100 million, the
bankers paid less than $63 million and took such a hefty percentage for
commissions and expenses that the British Treasury received less than $55
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million.78 This remained a sore point with Courtaulds, as well as Churchill,
who thought the U.K. had been ―fleeced by the bankers.‖79 It is interesting to
consider that many of the military supplies reaching the U.K. through LendLease in years to come would contain rayon materials from AVC factories.
Courtaulds was able to continue rayon production in the U.K. for most of the
war years but may not have been able to meet the massive increase in demand
for certain rayon products. Perhaps it was fortunate that American Viscose,
whose product would become so critical to the Allied powers, was the one major
British asset sold to the U.S. Through the War Production Board (WPB) and
other government agencies, the government could direct production priorities
and raw materials to manufacture an adequate supply.
Events in the Pacific quickly made clear the importance of American
Viscose‘s chemical yarns. Only five pages into his Arsenal of Democracy: The
Story of the War Production Board, Donald M. Nelson, the first chairman of the
WPB, began to write about rubber. It was January 1942; the United States was
newly at war with Japan, Italy, and Germany. Nelson wrote that the Japanese
―were cutting through the jungles down the Malay Peninsula, engulfing the
plantations where the bulk of the world‘s raw rubber was produced… Soon no
more cargoes of irreplaceable raw materials would be leaving those islands for
North America. We were really in trouble.‖80 Despite the recent expansions in
U.S. production of military equipment for national defense and supplying Allied
78

Coleman, Volume II, Rayon, 461.

79

Chernow, 463. According to D.C. Coleman on page 3 of Courtaulds: An Economic and Social
History, Volume III: Crisis and Change (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), the British government awarded
Courtaulds £27 million in compensation in July of 1942.
80

Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: the Story of American War Production (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 7.

39
countries, America in 1942 faced significant deficiencies in military and
material strength. President Roosevelt‘s administration and military officials
knew they would be required to fight a ―total war‖ against the Axis nations, one
in which mobility—in trucks, tanks, planes, etc.—was critical.81
In Front Royal, Virginia, the new American Viscose Corporation facility
had been in operation for one year. In short order, it would become the largest
U.S. producer of war-critical high tenacity rayon cord for use in tires, helping
stave off a rubber-shortage crisis, and ensure Allied military agility. The uses of
rayon and the field of rayon producers diversified by the start of World War II;
the major U.S. manufacturers were American Viscose, DuPont, Industrial
Rayon, American Enka, and North American Rayon.82 All of them employed
scientists to research new rayon product possibilities. One of their goals was to
produce rayon with a higher tensile strength, meaning it could bear greater
longitudinal stress than normal rayon before tearing. Such a discovery could
open a broad range of industrial uses for rayon.
By the early 1930s, Du Pont was producing a stronger yarn, spurring
Courtaulds scientists to develop a better method. By 1935, Courtaulds
patented a process for even higher tenacity cord. The key components were a
different mix of salts in the acid spinning bath and a mechanism that
simultaneously stretched the yarn while applying heat.83 The added pressure
―arranges the long-chain molecules into parallel lines.‖ Since the groups of
molecules are in parallel position and thus must be ―broken as bundles,‖ high
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tenacity rayon can withstand much greater force without breaking.84
Courtaulds started making this rayon for use in tire cord in 1939 at their
Coventry plant in England. The American Viscose plant in Front Royal, still
under Courtaulds ownership when it opened in 1940, manufactured rayon tire
cord from the beginning.85
Tire cord plays an extremely important role in determine performance of
pneumatic tires. Cords ―give the tire its shape, size stability, load-carrying
capacity, fatigue, and bruise resistance.‖86 Prior to the creation of high tenacity
rayon, tire manufacturers used cotton tire cord for this purpose. When World
War II broke out, there was little data regarding the relative merits of rayon tire
cord over cotton, although preliminary tests suggested that rayon was stronger
and ran cooler than cotton.87 After Japanese movements in the Pacific cut off
natural rubber supplies, however, scientists engaged in developing synthetic
rubber found that tires made from that substance worked best in combination
with rayon tire cord. Thus, global circumstances suddenly made high tenacity
rayon tire cord one of the war‘s most important resources. Although its
American Viscose holdings were soon to disappear from their portfolio,
―Courtaulds had made a breakthrough [with their 1935 patent] just in time.‖88
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With the marriage of rayon tire cord to synthetic rubber during World
War II, the technological momentum of viscose rayon, its manufacturing
process, and the corporate producers increased exponentially. At Front Royal,
the direct connections between the AVC plant and Allied military efforts had
specific long-term impacts. The military need, combined with the social values,
aspirations, and fears of the war years, locked in a pattern of production and a
relationship with the South Fork of the Shenandoah that changed very little
over the remainder of the plant‘s operating life.89
During World War II, the organizational might of the War Production
Board became a driving component of rayon‘s technological system, particularly
at American Viscose‘s Front Royal plant. In January 1942, just over a month
after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
summoned Donald Nelson to a meeting. Nelson listened in awe as the
President ―named the coefficients of the unheard-of volume of production which
would be necessary to supply the European and the Asiatic theaters of war‖ and
the problems to date with organizing war production. Roosevelt selected Nelson
to head up a new entity—the War Production Board—to coordinate a massive
expansion of manufacturing. The WPB as presented to Nelson had a
remarkable scope of responsibilities and powers:
to co-ordinate the whole production program; organize, for
production, American industry of all sizes and shapes; referee the
claims of the Army, the Navy, and the Maritime Commission and
get them sources of supply; apportion materials and the use of
facilities among claimants—and yet keep our Armed Forces
backed up by a stable civilian economy.90
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Within the WPB framework, different offices, divisions, and directors
focused on production and conservation of multiple types of resources,
including rubber, textiles, chemicals, and rayon. For example, there was an
Office of Rubber, a Tire Cord Branch, a Textile, Clothing and Leather Bureau
that included a Synthetic Textiles Division, and so on.91 It was an enormously
intricate government apparatus, charged with a mammoth task. Observing just
a minute corner of this—the production of rayon for military use—reveals
complexities, frustrations, and sobering realities that such a dramatic shift in
industrial production required.
America‘s reliance on imported rubber emerged as one of the great
material challenges of the war. By 1940, the U.S. transportation system was
largely motorized and thus reliant on rubber for tires. By the time of Pearl
Harbor, the nation had built a rubber reserve approximately equal to one year‘s
peacetime usage.92 The WPB‘s Donald Nelson wrote of the failure to stockpile
more rubber during 1940 with frustration: ―We had the money and we knew
where to get the stuff. Why we didn‘t exchange the money, of which we had
plenty, for war goods or raw materials, I don‘t know exactly.‖93
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First with Lend-Lease and then as the U.S. entered the war, the urgent
need for rubber for tire production became increasingly clear. Historian
Michael Edelstein wrote that this necessity for rubber and other resources grew
from the U.S. decision to fight a ―capital intensive war,‖ relying heavily on
equipment like tanks and planes. This was in part an effort to avoid the
heinous trench warfare of World War I, but the U.S. also faced a German army
that had successfully used tank and air offenses against Poland, France, and
Russia.94 Meeting this fast-moving enemy compelled the U.S. to rapidly create
mobile, military machinery in quantity, and that required rubber tires for
trucks, tanks, planes and numerous others military resources.
The nascent production of synthetic rubber as of 1941 was nowhere near
adequate to meet wartime demand. Soon after Pearl Harbor, Nelson reported to
Roosevelt and Churchill that the U.S. had inadequate supplies of natural
rubber and no synthetic rubber facilities, only ―a rather promising technique for
the manufacture of synthetic rubber…‖ He wrote, ―I think we are going to be in
terrible straits… The United States travels on rubber, and our army is helpless
without it. We even use tremendous quantities in building warships and
airplanes.‖95 In order to buy time to develop synthetic rubber manufacturing,
the War Production Board placed limits on civilian use of rubber, rationing
tires, tubes, and gasoline, lowering the speed limit, and prioritizing
allocations.96
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As efforts to put synthetic rubber into production intensified, high
tenacity rayon cord became increasingly important. Military and civilian tests
undertaken in the early years of the war indicated that cotton cord was
―probably unsatisfactory‖ for use with synthetic rubber. The Army and Navy
Munitions Board requested a priority designation for rayon tire cord in the
spring of 1942. A May 3rd confidential report named high-tenacity viscose
rayon as the military‘s preferred choice for tire cord due to its strength,
resistance to high temperature, greater mileage, and use of ―less strategic raw
materials than the other types.‖ While stating that, ―no substitutes are
available for rayon,‖ the report also identified the major drawback of high
tenacity rayon: like natural rubber and synthetic rubber, it too was in short
supply. ―Motor transport alone could consume about three times the entire
proposed production of 1943.‖97 In September 1942, the War Production Board
signaled its concurrence and gave rayon tire cord an Urgency rating.98
The designation granted the WPB power to require rayon manufacturers
to produce high tenacity cord and to dictate quantities. The WPB worked with
companies to supply machinery and raw materials, locate adequate labor, and
expand facilities. The five rayon-manufacturing companies in the U.S.—
American Viscose, DuPont, Industrial Rayon, American Enka, and North
American Rayon—expressed willingness to participate and submitted plans to
shift production from rayon for consumer use to high tenacity rayon. Only
97
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American Viscose tried to stipulate conditions for increasing their supply of
high tenacity rayon, requesting that the government ―assure a market for the
yarn ‗for a long enough time to justify conversion and the investment
involved‘… and ‗grant a price increase sufficient to reimburse the corporation
for its loses resulting from conversion.‘‖99
Quantities of synthetic rubber manufactured in the U.S. jumped over the
course of the war, from 28 million tons in 1942 to nearly 922 million tons in
1945.100 Rayon producers and the War Production Board had to scramble to
keep up. Internal WPB documents demonstrate the challenges inherent in this
process. For the first two years, rayon production always lagged behind
projected military needs, as expansion at the factories took longer than
expected. In March of 1943, new tire tests found that rayon cord was
absolutely essential for larger sizes of synthetic rubber tires. Other tire cord
materials, such as cotton, could not adequately support the weight of large
tanks and trucks. Projected requirements for high tenacity rayon cord for the
remainder of 1943 and 1944 grew dramatically. Requirements for 1944 more
than doubled.101
Demand increased further as military supply units adjusted their
requests for tire cord to fit emerging needs. In early 1944, Donald Nelson at the
WPB broke the news that a new manufacturer of synthetic rubber would
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increase production considerably, so that supplies of synthetic rubber
threatened to ―exceed the corresponding supply of tire cord.‖ Rayon mills were
already strained, needing to produce enough material for both military use and
―essential civilian requirements.‖102 The military demand strained supplies for
―vital and indispensible civilian activities as transportation and farming.‖103 To
meet these demands, the WPB had no option but to shift materials and labor to
support rayon cord manufacturing.
Certain requirements for production of high tenacity rayon compounded
the challenge of manufacturing adequate supplies. For one, processing the
material required sufficient quantities of chemicals. By 1942, the War
Production Board controlled all allocations of sulfuric acid, one of the main
chemicals involved in rayon production.104 The agency covered all costs for
General Chemical Company to build and operate a new factory adjacent to
American Viscose. An elevated pipeline crossed the fence between the
properties and pumped sulfuric acid directly into the rayon plant.105 Early in
the war, the WPB also designated Stauffer Chemical Company to build a factory
near Front Royal to produce 26.4 million pounds of carbon disulfide annually.
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The plant‘s ―entire output was to be consumed by the [American Viscose]
Facility.‖106
The WPB sought to keep their investments safe, highlighting again the
critical value of high tenacity rayon to the military. As the war went on,
security guards were organized and enrolled into a civilian auxiliary to the
Army‘s Military Police. The Brigadier General in charge of the military police
spoke to the Guard about preventing ―espionage, sabotage and other
threats.‖107 Herman F. Stuhr, a manager at the rayon plant from 1940-1976,
described his realization of the true military importance of high tenacity rayon
when the guards at the plant began to wear guns.108
The military need was such that the WPB even converted some
munitions factories over to manufacturing machinery for rayon production.
The machines used to make rayon yarns for fabrics and other civilian goods
could not produce high tenacity rayon tire cord. Facilities needed specialized
equipment to stretch, spin, and twist rayon yarn into cord. This was one of the
disadvantages of rayon over cotton: ―the twisting and weaving of rayon cord
require[d] considerably more facilities than for an equal poundage of cotton.‖109
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Unfortunately, the existing facility at Front Royal did not have adequate space
to accommodate the new spinning machines and other necessary equipment.
Despite the setbacks, the American Viscose plant at Front Royal grew to
be the largest producer of high tenacity rayon in the U.S., increasing its
capacity from 25 million pounds to 82 million pounds annually,110 and
manufacturing roughly a third of total U.S. output. Expansion of the plant to
accommodate this production proceeded with a variety of twists and turns. A
shortage of labor ranked among the most difficult challenge for the WPB.
Stonewalling by both the War Manpower Commission and the Virginia Draft
Board delayed WPB requests for draft deferments for textile workers.
Bureaucratic wrangling also slowed the transfer of additional workers from
other industries to the Front Royal facility by several months. J. Spencer Love,
Director of the Textile, Clothing and Leather Bureau of the WPB, fumed that if
the requested employees had been made available to all U.S. rayon producers,
―hours of operation would have been brought to 144 per week with a resultant
increase in production of 16,500,000 pounds of cord per half year.‖111 Industry
wide, the estimated shortage of manpower in early 1944 was 2,500 people or
6%. According to Love, this was ―the main problem confronting the industry.‖
New cord twisting machines arrived at the rayon plants with no one to run
them.112
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These challenges manifested in a variety of ways at the American Viscose
plant in Front Royal. At its peak, the plant employed a combined total of nearly
4,000 people either working inside the plant making rayon or doing
construction to expand the facility. Labor shortages due to military enlistments
and the draft required plant managers to scour the countryside in search of
workers. In order to conserve tires and supply as much local labor as possible,
the WPB sponsored buses to crisscross the Shenandoah Valley picking up
workers for the various shifts at the plant. Workers transferred from out-oftown by the War Manpower Commission in Front Royal only to find a severe
housing shortage in the community. The WPB faced additional bureaucratic
struggles, this time with the National Housing Agency, to gain authorization to
construct new housing, which in turn required additional labor to complete.
Difficulties at the top sifted down into dissatisfaction among workers. By
coincidence, a special tire cord meeting, called by WPB chief Donald Nelson in
March of 1944, occurred the same morning that employees of Rust Engineering
at the plant in Front Royal went on strike. Most of the workers were imported
construction labor working on the many expansions to the plant. Housing
shortages led to the strike; the community needed about 400 trailers, as well as
barracks and houses, to accommodate both the construction labor and the ―inmigrants‖ supplying the mill with new operating personnel. The meeting
minutes blame the War Manpower Commission for the delay and reflect the
selection of a special representative to ensure delivery of the trailers. The
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meeting minutes also note with alarm that the strike could further destabilize
efforts to meet rayon objectives for the year.113
In response to such events, Nelson‘s staff encouraged him to take steps
to improve morale at facilities like Front Royal. They note questions among
men in the mills about ―whether the government was really serious in their
desire for increased production.‖ 114 Long hours and challenging working
conditions increased the workers‘ frustrations with the company. The WPB
attempted to pressure the U.S. rayon plants to run mills seven days a week.
Some met the requirement; others could not convince ―their labor to operate at
all on Sunday.‖115
These challenges were never completely remedied, but the WPB and
American Viscose made an effort to reward employees and emphasize the
importance of their work for the national cause. Nelson visited factories and
met in-person with producers. He specifically recommended that
manufacturers show their workers a certain motion picture that demonstrated
vividly ―the urgency of the entire war program and the need for its full
support.‖116 Actress Greer Garson visited Front Royal and gave a talk at
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American Viscose emphasizing the importance of increased production for the
war effort.117 Toward the end of the war, the WPB organized a rally at the Front
Royal plant to award to the facility ―the E for Excellence that the War
Production Board awarded for excellence in War Production.‖118 In addition,
AVC organized ―family nights‖ at the plant featuring shows, food, and games
with prizes for children (see fig. 5). Avisco News, a company publication,
included employee appreciations, as well as news and letters home from AVC
workers in military service overseas.119

Figure 5. Family night at the AVC plant, 1943. Courtesy of Warren Heritage Society.
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In addition to labor problems and friction from other government
agencies, challenges to rayon production sometimes came from within the War
Production Board. In October of 1944, the WPB Operations Office—without the
knowledge of the WPB‘s Tire Cord Branch—removed high tenacity rayon yarn
from the Production Urgency List. Inclusion on the list meant that plants
received priority in the apportionment of labor and construction of facilities.120
The director of the Textile, Clothing and Leather Bureau, J. Spencer Love,
expressed grave concern to the Operations Vice Chair, and requested that ―high
tenacity rayon construction and production‖ be reinstated on the list. Love
explained that the Rubber Bureau continued to increase its requirements for
the rayon cord, while yarn production lagged behind forecasts. Most of the
delay, Love wrote, stemmed from ―labor shortages or work stoppages of one sort
or another.‖ The continued protection of the Urgency List was crucial,
―particularly at Front Royal, VA‖ and two other facilities. Love closed his memo
with a plea: after suffering from chronic labor shortages for a year and a half,
reducing the urgency status of rayon tire cord would be demoralizing for the
mill workers, ―just at a time when they are beginning to climb the hill toward
full utilization of their facilities.‖121
Throughout World War II, American Viscose at Front Royal faced
constant challenges, proceeding by a multilinear path, rife with trail and error.
In January of 1945, expansion at the facility still lagged months behind

120

121

United States Civilian Production Administration, 840.

―Memorandum: J. Spencer Love to Hiland G. Batcheller. Subject: Production Urgency List,
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schedule. A thirty-three page memo on the ―Development of War Production
Board Tire Cord Program‖ outlined reasons for the hold-up:
While the principal difficulty in connection with this project
appears to have been the shortage of labor as such, some
contributing factors are suggested by the following statement
contained in the May 15, 1944 Monthly Progress Report of the Tire
Cord Branch: ―The project at Front Royal has suffered from lack of
coordination of the efforts of scores of individually competent
people, representing the government and the company, to do
something about labor, housing, community services, and a
multitude of related matters.‖122
The WPB thus summarized the difficulties and failings during World War II at
the American Viscose plant in Front Royal. One issue, however, that proved to
have lasting and devastating repercussions, remained unmentioned in any
existing War Production Board documents: the disposal of huge quantities of
chemical byproducts from manufacturing high tenacity rayon.123 The priorities
and urgency of the war sidelined any concerns about waste disposal or
protection for the Shenandoah River.
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It is possible to make such a broad statement with a fair degree of confidence. Several federal
agencies and the FMC Corporation filed lawsuits over liability for cleanup of these wastes in the 1990s.
The extensive research undertaken by each side located no direct reference to chemical wastes in WPB
documents. However, using eyewitness reports and secondary documentation, FMC successfully
demonstrated that the WPB had knowledge of waste disposal practices and problems. The courts ruled that
the Department of Commerce (which absorbed the WPB after the war) was liable for a percentage of
cleanup costs due to the WPB’s control of production of high tenacity rayon and heavy involvement with
supplying machinery, chemicals, raw materials, and labor that contributed to increased waste.

Chapter 3
Manufacturing Rayon, Manufacturing Toxic Waste

World War II added a tremendous amount of technological momentum to
the rayon plant at Front Royal. At the same time, however, the massive
increase in production destabilized the plant‘s relationship to the South Fork of
the Shenandoah. American Viscose‘s dependence on the river grew more than
threefold since the start of the war. With an output, by 1945, of 82 million
pounds of high tenacity rayon cord per year, the plant used at least 41 million
gallons of water every day, and probably a good deal more.124 The river helped
to win World War II. Unfortunately, the massive increase in rayon production
created a flood of chemical wastes needing treatment and disposal.
Technologies for treating chemical waste in the 1940s were inadequate to
begin with. The wastewater treatment facility at American Viscose was engulfed
and overwhelmed, an example of how the managers of rayon‘s technological
system interacted with the river ―without fully understanding what they [had]
created‖ and what rayon waste could do.125 By 1945, the river was a casualty of
war. From the American Viscose outflow pipe to the confluence with the
Potomac at Harper‘s Ferry, the Shenandoah was essentially dead. The chemical
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wastes entering the river had ―almost eliminated aquatic life in the Shenandoah
River for a 50-mile stretch.‖126
The chemicals that devastated the river came from each stage of the
viscose rayon manufacturing process. Each step in the transformation of wood
cellulose into rayon yarn involved some sort of chemical; none of them were
healthy for the South Fork. Viscose rayon begins with tree pulp. American
Viscose sourced most of its pulp from softwood trees such as spruce and
hemlock grown in Alaska, Canada, and the Pacific Northwest. Chipping,
pulping and pressing the trees occurred off-site, so that the cellulose arrived by
boxcar at the Front Royal site as white sheets, said to resemble blotting paper
(see fig. 6).127
Sodium hydroxide, frequently referred to as caustic soda or lye, was the
first chemical used on-site in the rayon process. The cellulose sheets soaked in
large tanks full of caustic soda diluted with water; this expanded the fiber,
leading to a thicker viscose solution.128 The sheets were mechanically pressed
to remove excess liquid, then crumbled and shredded into a material termed
―white crumb‖ (see figs. 7-9). The crumbs had to age for two or three days in
carefully controlled conditions in order to correctly oxidize the material. Carbon
disulfide (CS2) in gas form was the next chemical involved in the process.
Churning the aged white crumb with carbon disulfide created a cellulose
xanthate, yellowish in color, and thus referred to as ―yellow crumb.‖ This
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material, when mixed again with dilute caustic soda, dissolved into a viscose: a
thick, honey colored, cellulose xanthate suspension.
Viscose ―ripened‖ for four or five days in climate-controlled viscose
cellars. Part of the xanthation reaction (the chemical reaction of carbon
disulfide with cellulose) reversed at this time, leaving a material that
regenerated more easily to cellulose in the next phase of production. The
reversible reaction also freed CS2 gases from the viscose into the air. The
viscose next underwent filtering and degassing; if it met specifications, the
material was pumped to the Production Department.
The next phase of the process regenerated the cellulosic fibers in the
viscose into continuous filaments. Pumps forced the viscose through platinum
spinnerets, devices resembling very small shower heads, each punctured with
hundreds of small holes. The resulting fibers immediately entered an acid
spinning bath that solidified the cellulose into continuous rayon fibers. The
spinning bath comprised a mix of chemicals; the composition varied for
different types of rayon, but in general, the bath contained sulfuric acid,
sodium sulfate, zinc sulfate, and glucose.129 Again, amounts varied depending
on the type of rayon, but in general, making one pound of rayon required
approximately one pound of wood pulp, ―1.8 pounds of sulfuric acid, 1.4
pounds of sodium hydroxide, 0.5 pounds of glucose, 0.4 pounds of carbon
disulfide, 0.4 pounds of other chemicals,‖ as well as caustic soda, and at least
175 gallons of water.130
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As they emerged from the acid baths, the rayon threads wound through
several wheels and spun into a revolving box (see figs. 10-11). The process,
called box spinning, stretched the threads, causing the cellulose chains to line
up in approximately parallel lines and giving the rayon threads greater
strength. Higher levels of tenacity required more extensive stretching later in
the process and thus additional equipment (see figs. 12-13). When the box
filled up, the spinning machine had to be shut down to remove the spun yarn,
now referred to as a ―cake.‖ Special cabinets stored the cakes for a short time
to allow further venting of carbon disulfide. Next the Cake Wash Department
sent the material through a huge machine that washed, bleached, and dried the
cakes of rayon yarn (see figs. 15-16).131 Creation of the major chemical wastes
essentially stopped at this point in the procedure; remaining steps involved
twisting the yarn and preparing it for shipping. While the plant was in
operation, this process from steeping cellulose to shipping finished rayon yarn
was continuous. Thousands of gallons of viscose moved through the plant
every hour.132
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Figures 6-19. Rayon production procedure at the American Viscose plant in
Front Royal, early 1940s.

Figure 6. Cellulose sheets in storage, 1941. Courtesy of WHS.

Figure 7. Loading cellulose sheets for steeping in sodium hydroxide, 1941. Courtesy of WHS.
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Figure 8. Pressing cellulose sheets after steeping in sodium hydroxide, 1941. Courtesy of WHS.

Figure 9. White Crumb, 1941. Courtesy of WHS.
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Figure 10. Spinning machines. Courtesy of WHS. Note: It is unclear whether this photo shows
machines used to spin high tenacity rayon yarns for tire cord or a lower tenacity fiber.

Figure 11. Detail of spinning machines. Courtesy of WHS.
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Figure 12. Stretching and winding rayon yarn to make high tenacity cord. Courtesy of WHS.

Figure 13. Close up of stretching machine and worker, 1943. Courtesy of WHS.
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Figure 14. Loading cakes of rayon into cake wash machine, 1941. Courtesy of WHS.

Figure 15. Detail of cake wash machine, 1941. Courtesy of WHS.
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The continuous rayon manufacturing process required a tremendous
amount of electricity. While the plant was under construction in 1938, Front
Royal‘s Town Manager noted, ―they will use about 80 times as much electricity
out there as we use in the whole town.‖133 To meet this need, the facility built
its own coal-burning power plant with six boilers on-site. Train cars delivered
coal directly to the plant from the Norfolk and Western tracks that bisected the
property. In the 1980s, estimates showed that the plant used roughly 1,000
tons of coal a day; it would likely have used much larger amounts in previous
decades when production levels were higher. Many other materials for the
facility also arrived by rail: tank cars with chemicals and fuel oil, box cars of
pulp sheets, lumber, machinery, and rock salt for softening water.134
The technological system of the rayon plant required inputs of these
multiple materials and produced a range of toxic outputs, all of which had an
eventual harmful impact on the health of the South Fork of the Shenandoah
River. All told, the rayon facility produced three main hazardous waste
streams: fly ash from burning coal in the power plant; alkaline wastes,
especially off-specification sodium cellulose xanthate-based viscose, commonly
referred to as ―waste viscose;‖ and liquid acid wastes with zinc-hydroxide and
other salts from the acid bath process.135 The Avtex facility made several types
of viscose rayon yarn over the course of its operating life, each requiring
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variation on this basic manufacturing procedure. However, the processes were
similar enough that the waste streams and avenues by which the chemicals
migrated into the environment were essentially the same.
Carbon disulfide entered the environment as a liquid, gas, or component
of waste viscose. Since the reaction of CS2 with the cellulose in ―white crumb‖
was reversible, the chemical constantly released from the resulting viscose
substance into the surrounding environment. Thus, during every stage of the
process after xanthation occurs—the ripening, spinning, venting, and washing
processes—carbon disulfide returned to its original chemical composition and
―escaped‖ into the air, the acid spinning bath, or the cake wash water. The
factory vented airborne CS2 through its smokestack. At present, viscose rayon
factories remain the primary source of carbon disulfide in the atmosphere and
the environment in general. In modern day rayon plants, ventilation into the
atmosphere can total anywhere between 15 and 40 tons per day.136 For years,
residents of the Front Royal community ruefully joked that the rotten-egg
stench of carbon disulfide ―smelled like money.‖137
The financial benefit of the rayon plant came with a high cost, both to
human health and to riverine life in the South Fork. Excessive exposure to
carbon disulfide has dramatic health effects in humans and other mammals,
including nerve, vascular, and ophthalmologic damage, as well as psychological
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disturbances.138 Safety reports compiled by the union at American Viscose in
1946, before protective eyewear became mandatory, described employees
suffering from an undisclosed set of symptoms termed ―fume eyes.‖139 Aquatic
species in the South Fork of the Shenandoah River also demonstrated adverse
reactions. The most impacted were at the bottom of the food chain: aquatic
invertebrates experienced reduced hatching and development defects; frogs and
small fish showed deformities, and growth of algae was inhibited.140 Carbon
disulfide could also contaminate the environment when waste viscose was
disposed of improperly. As the viscose continued to age, carbon disulfide
continued to release into whatever medium was available. If left exposed,
rainwater could percolate through the waste viscose, capture CS2 and carry it
into groundwater, streams, or into the river.
Alkaline wastes from American Viscose also contaminated the South
Fork. The equipment at the factory reclaimed much of the caustic soda used in
the steeping presses; however, some cellulosic material remained mixed in the
caustic soda after the pressing process. The reclaim system separated the two,
leaving a material called ―heavy cellulose.‖ Standard operating procedures in
the early 1940s called for the substance to be discarded into a chemical sewer;
it is unclear whether this sewer drained directly to the river in the early ‗40s.
Heavy cellulose in an aquatic environment could be dangerous. The material
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had a high biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). Herman Stuhr, a chemical
engineer and manager at the plant from 1940-1976, explained that BOD ―is a
very common problem with almost anything that gets in a river. It tends to
reduce the available oxygen for fish or anything else that lives in the river.‖ In
addition, despite the reclaim system, some caustic soda still left the plant either
with the heavy cellulose, in the cake wash water, or in the form of waste
viscose. If improperly aged, the alkaline ―white crumb‖ material could become
unusable and join the waste stream.141 At certain concentrations, caustic
soda—aka sodium hydroxide—is extremely corrosive, dangerous to human and
environmental health. It can raise the pH of aquatic environments and is
extremely toxic for fish and aquatic plants.142
Acid and zinc wastes from the spinning baths comprised the third major
waste stream from the rayon plant at Front Royal. Although a reclaim system
allowed reuse of much of the acid bath, a significant quantity still left the plant.
In fact, wastewater treatment efforts in the early 1940s targeted sulfuric acid.
The water used to wash rayon yarn was the main carrier, although accidents
and overflow from other parts of the process caused occasional blasts of acid
into the treatment system. Sulfuric acid is also a highly corrosive substance,
but unlike caustic soda, it drops the pH level in aquatic ecosystems. Sulfuric
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acid in high enough concentrations can wipe out a wide range of aquatic life,
from macroinvertebrates, to shellfish, fish, and aquatic plants.143
Courtaulds‘ chemists discovered that zinc sulphate was an important
addition to the sulfuric acid bath used to solidify rayon fibers. As Herman
Stuhr noted, ―anything that had the slightest trace of spin bath in it had zinc in
it.‖ Zinc, then, left the plant via the same paths as sulfuric acid, the cake wash
water and any accidental acid overflows. Manufacturing high tenacity rayon
required a higher concentration of zinc in the acid bath—5% for high tenacity
versus 1% for textile yarns. High tenacity rayon also required more washing,
resulting in increased waste water.144 Zinc compounds joined the list of wastes
from the rayon plant that, at sufficient concentration, are ―extremely toxic to
aquatic life.‖ Zinc wastes posed an additional challenge since conventional
wastewater treatment facilities cannot adequately treat the material; it must be
precipitated out of the waste stream. Properly done, zinc can be reclaimed and
reused. However, only in the 1970s did the plant‘s waste treatment system
include that procedure.
Even under peace time operating conditions, manufacturing rayon was a
messy and inefficient process. All of the possible ways to create waste became
more likely and frequent during the World War II years, due to the huge
increase in production, the requirements of high tenacity rayon, and the
shortage of well-qualified labor. The urgent need for tire cord pushed the limits
of the rayon technological system. In the rush for production, the plant‘s
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emergency release value was to purge masses of polluting material. The river
became the overflow receptacle for all the weaknesses in the system; any
production problems flowed downstream into the South Fork.
As a rule, manufacturing high tenacity rayon created more polluting
waste than regular textile rayon yarns. The spinning process required greater
quantities and concentrations of sulfuric acid and zinc, and the sharp increase
in production during the war necessitated greater quantities of all chemicals.
In addition, every element of high tenacity rayon had to meet stricter, more
stringent, specifications. Stuhr explained that the disparity in quality control
occurred because tire cord had to stand up to much more rigorous conditions
than, for example, a shirt made of rayon fabric. Thus every element of the
process must be precisely controlled: ―when you make high tenacity rayon,
you‘re pretty close to the ragged edge of making it all the time simply because
you‘re asking the yarn to assume properties that it can only assume if
everything is perfect… Any little catastrophe… can interfere with this
operation.‖ To obtain such high standards, any materials that did not meet
specifications had to be discarded. In particular, off-spec or scrap viscose could
not make ―first class tire yarn;‖ the material could not be reclaimed and was
unusable for any other purpose.145
Unfortunately, many aspects of the manufacturing process for high
tenacity rayon exacerbated the inefficiencies within the regular rayon system. A
staff engineer at the facility noted that, throughout its operating life, any time
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the plant was in operation, viscose waste was constantly created.146 Under
normal circumstances, any of a number of events could make viscose unusable.
CS2 is highly explosive, and churns occasionally blew up, scorching the viscose.
Workers might mix an incorrect ratio of ―white crumb‖ to carbon disulfide.
Most frequently, viscose had to be thrown out because it had aged too long.
Since CS2 begins to escape from viscose as soon as it is mixed, the aging
process must be carefully timed. Stuhr explains that ―aging doesn‘t stop no
matter where the viscose is, whether it‘s in the pipes or whether it‘s out in the
truck somewhere.‖147 Once ripened viscose reaches the proper composition, it
must be spun within a precise timeframe. For high tenacity rayon, the margin
of error was extremely slim.
The mechanical procedures used within rayon‘s technological system
required a certain amount of waste. Even in an ideal manufacturing scenario
in which every element of the facility‘s technology functioned continuously,
waste was inevitable. The balance of chemicals, timing, and mechanical design
was simply too fragile. Some batches of viscose would always go bad from
being aged improperly or acquiring impurities. Viscose filters would inevitably
clog, backing up aging viscose in the lines. The spinning machines caused
another kink in the system. Anytime the machines turned off, viscose aged in
the pump lines and had to be flushed out to join the facility‘s waste stream.
Even without motor failure or other mechanical problems, shut down had to
occur a few times per shift in order to remove finished cakes of yarn.
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In general, problems with machinery occurred more frequently with high
tenacity rayon. As a thicker thread, high tenacity rayon cakes filled the
spinning boxes more quickly and had to be removed five to ten times more
often. The frequent shut downs led to frequent motor burn out, further
heightening waste production. In addition, high tenacity rayon required a
higher viscosity thicker viscose mix, clogging filters more quickly. To produce
high tenacity rayon, all spinning machines were upgraded at the outset of the
war. Shutting down each machine for several days to make the upgrades
greatly increased the quantity of off-spec material.148 Richard Almy, the plant
engineer at AVC, noted that two major power outages occurred during the
course of the war—one caused by a flood, another by a fire. Both times, all the
viscose in the plant had to be scrapped.149
Deployment of hundreds of American Viscose employees overseas further
multiplied the waste problem at the factory. Although the War Production
Board did procure draft deferments for some workers, labor shortages were a
constant problem at the Front Royal facility. Employees were needed not just to
replace those serving in the military but also to staff the new machines for
increased production. In the face of greatly increased production requirements,
management sought employees all across the region, running buses in shifts to
pick up workers. In the words of a union official at Local 371, they would hire
―anyone who was warm.‖150
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Higher numbers of workers under any conditions meant an increased
opportunity for human error, but drastic recruitment measures at American
Viscose resulted in an under-trained and sometimes unreliable workforce. With
almost the entire plant‘s production shifted suddenly and rapidly to high
tenacity rayon, not only the new employees but also the managers had to adapt
to a new set of procedures. The high specifications for high tenacity rayon,
coupled with these labor problems, led to a vast increase in waste, particularly
waste viscose.151
The company struggled with the problem of absenteeism throughout the
war years. The spinning room had a particularly high rate, probably in part
because of unpleasant work conditions: hot, with constant acid fumes. In the
words of Charles Leadman, a union official, it was ―not a glorious place to
work.‖152 Herman Stuhr provided a manager‘s perspective on the new
employees and the absenteeism problem:
the ones we were able to dredge up out of the back country during
the war… in all probability had never seen an industrial plant of
any kind let alone a rayon plant. They weren‘t accustomed to
working in that kind of environment and they weren‘t accustomed
to making as much money as… [an] industrial job paid him and
the result was that between the two influences, they would tend to
work as many days in the week as they felt supplied them with as
much money as they could live on that week, then they just
wouldn‘t come to work the rest of the week.
On weekends, sometimes as many as 10 to 20 percent of employees would not
show up. This happened with a fair degree of frequency. Without enough men
and women to run all the spinning machines, the viscose produced for that
purpose had to be disposed of. The company installed an emergency pump to
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allow all the waste viscose to simply be pumped directly from the viscose cellar
to the trucks that would take it to the dumping pits. If twenty percent of the
work force did not come to work, the company had to scrap roughly 14,000
gallons of viscose, enough to make 10,000 pounds of rayon tire cord, enough
for 1,000 truck tires. Stuhr estimated that 14,000 gallons of viscose would fill
―a tank ten feet in diameter and 24 feet high.‖153
The problem ended, Mr. Stuhr notes, at the end of the war when soldiers
returned home to their jobs, and ―the hillbillies went back to the mountains.‖154
Part of his perspective seems born out by numbers reflecting waste viscose
outputs. After the war, production at the Front Royal plant of rayon for tire
cord and other purposes continued to grow, though at a slower rate, for several
years.155 However, the amount of waste viscose decreased from a high point of
21,000 cubic yards per year in 1945 to roughly 10,000 cubic yards per year.
Stuhr attributes that to a return to ―normal operation. The fellows that had
been in the Army came back and the crisis of incompetent help and that sort of
thing got straightened out and everything went back to normal.‖156
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Chapter 4
Treating Toxic Waste

―Normal‖ conditions at the American Viscose plant in 1945 did not
equate to normalcy for the South Fork of the Shenandoah. Downstream of
American Viscose‘s sewer and effluent lines, the riverine half of the river-plant
complex was in tatters. Considering the content and quantity of the plant‘s
waste streams during World War II, it is not surprising that the river‘s aquatic
life was nearly eliminated. Unaffected by devastated downstream water quality,
American Viscose rode the post-war boom, increasing water withdrawals from
the river without consequence. Yet the river was never entirely without
advocates. Before and during the war, some individuals within the larger
technological system made efforts to keep toxics out of rivers and streams,
through capture, recycling, or safe disposal of wastes from rayon
manufacturing.
For decades before American Viscose came to the Valley, there were
always those who responded to the fouling of the Shenandoah with the goal of
protecting the river, and who defined the river differently, not simply as a
resource and a dump, but as a recreational, aesthetic, or biologically valuable
location. They responded to pollution using what tools they had—whether they
were sportsmen lobbying the General Assembly for water pollution controls, or
state scientists using fines and permits to enforce pollution controls, or
engineers at the rayon plant in search of effective methods to limit pollution.
Heroes and villains change places over course of the half-decade that the plant
operated, until it becomes evident that most of the time there were neither
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heroes nor villains, just people reacting to challenges with limited tools and
foreknowledge.
The trajectories by which human beings come to understand and adapt
to their natural environment are always multilinear, involving experimentation
to find what works. Modern technological systems, however, shift, and
sometimes limit, multilinear exploration by providing buffers from
environmental harms. People who can afford to use these systems, or buy their
outputs, frequently include those in decision-making positions. Technological
buffers distance them from human-caused burdens on the natural environment
and erase the direct cause and effect between people‘s actions and
environmental harm. In addition, Western spiritual and scientific thought has
long fostered the idea that humans are separate from the natural world in some
way, obscuring our reliance on nature, breeding ―disregard to nature‘s inherent
value and fragility.‖157
With buffers both physical and psychological, no longer does the cause of
an environmental hazard necessarily have to be halted. A vast range of other
options are available. Some water-born pollutants can be filtered, diluted, or
rendered harmless by the addition of other chemicals. Government agencies
can permit a measurable amount of environmental harm to occur so long as it
stays below certain thresholds. If these options do not work, polluters often use
money and influence to reset agency thresholds, rewrite permits, change laws,
or simply pay off fines rather than clean up harms. Complicating this picture
for American Viscose and many other polluters in the 1940s was the incomplete
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knowledge available at that time about exact correlations between types of
chemical waste and environmental degradation. This knowledge is by no
means complete now, nor will it ever be, as consequences in the natural world
can never be predicted with absolute accuracy.
Part of the problem in the 1940s was that disposing of large quantities of
chemical waste remained relatively unexplored. As Craig Colten and Peter
Skinner explain in their history of industrial waste:
except for plating, smelting, and certain refinery wastes… most
persistent and toxic industrial wastes were manageable, at least
until the 1930s—largely because the volumes produced were
relatively small. During the 1930s and 1940s, the organic
chemicals industry flourished and created a new spectrum of
wastes whose quantities, toxicity, and persistence took quantum
leaps. 158
Nevertheless, awareness among industry and the public about hazardous waste
in the early twentieth century is well documented.159 As early as 1917, a
leading sanitary engineer argued that ―the impression that the [industrial]
wastes cannot be successfully treated is in many cases not true.‖160 Scientists
understood the potential hazards of certain waste disposal practices. A 1931
chemical engineering textbook made clear that disposing of ―liquid wastes to the
ground surface could lead to contamination of groundwater supplies down
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gradient.‖ Waste treatment practices during this time period tended to focus on
removing a single ―offending waste‖ from factory effluent. Although some
treatment technologies did exist, more often than not companies chose to locate
in isolated areas to protect them from complaints or relied on rivers to dilute
their pollutants, based on ―nineteenth-century concepts of natural
purification.‖161
These theories viewed running water as uniformly healthy and capable of
purifying any waste, while stagnant water harbored death and disease. An older
theory, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, speculated that ―water was purified
by the fire burning at the centre of the earth and protected from pollution by an
impermeable layer… [therefore] water pollution was a phenomenon that could
not exist.‖ 162 Much common wisdom in the early twentieth century held to the
belief that running water could purify itself of any substance through the
―dilution of wastes and the movement of the water.‖ Thus, in the 1920s, a
tremendous amount of human and industrial wastes were discharged untreated
in ―oceans, large rivers, and lakes.‖ 163 When the larger American Viscose
Corporation (with its seven plants and eighteen thousand employees) was
established in the U.S. in 1910, this form of disposal of industrial waste was
common.
By the 1930s, however, enough shared knowledge was available that
corporate malfeasance regarding industrial waste could be identified. A 1939
article in Industrial and Engineering Chemistry provides insight into the
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behavior of some corporations with regard to pollution control. The author
urged manufacturers to take certain steps to reduce their waste stream by
working cooperatively with ―trade organizations and pollution control agencies,‖
rather than dodging responsibility by ―attempting to avoid waste treatment,
employing homemade makeshifts, or buying off lower riparian objectors.‖164 An
influential 1927 book on the rayon industry by engineer M.H. Avram reflected
the problematic attitudes. He first explained that any water entering a rayon
plant will become contaminated with caustic soda, sulfuric acid, and other
chemicals; ―If these waste waters can be dumped into a sewer or river without
any neutralizing process it is an advantage. However, local restrictions may be
so severe that excessive expense might ensue.‖165 There are two insights here:
first, that many communities were concerned about harmful chemicals entering
the environment, and second, that many rayon companies were not.
Although the American Viscose plant was considered state of the art in
1940, its waste control system was never particularly good at protecting the
river. Managers cobbled it together on the fly during World War II to deal with
certain major problems while overlooking others. Throughout the rest of the
plant‘s operating life, even with increasingly stringent pollution control laws,
managers kept tweaking the system but never fixed it. The waste treatment
and disposal practices remained essentially the same from the late 1940s until
the plant closed in 1989 and were never capable of keeping pollution from
reaching the Shenandoah.
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American Viscose‘s original state-of-the-art design included a ―complete
recovery system‖166 to reclaim chemicals and control waste. This reflected
1930s trends in industry, perhaps pushed by Depression-era scarcity, to
recover and reuse waste while conserving raw materials.167 By 1940, such a
system probably recovered some amount of both the alkaline and acid wastes
from rayon manufacturing. New rayon plants in the late 1930s utilized what
was known as the Cerini process to reclaim caustic solution via dialysis from
the liquid used for steeping cellulose sheets. Recovering the solution was
profitable for the company and also helped with the treatment of some waste,
lowering its alkalinity and making further treatment and disposal less
intensive.168
Courtaulds, the parent company of American Viscose, began to reclaim
acid waste in 1915 at their Coventry plant due to shortages in chemical
supplies.169 It appears that some if not all of their AVC plants also included
some kind of reclaim technology. At the Front Royal plant, Acid Reclaim
constituted its own department, a section of the facility with ―a maze of tanks,
evaporators, coolers, and pipes.‖ Mechanisms within the department pumped
acid from the spinning baths and back, removing a by-product, anhydrous
sodium sulfate, that was sold as an industrial product called Glauber‘s salt.
The system contained millions of gallons of acid.170
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Other than these reclaim systems, evidence of any additional methods in
use when the plant opened to prevent chemical pollution at Front Royal is
inconclusive. Documents suggest that the facility opened in 1940 either
without a waste treatment system, or with one that only treated sanitary waste.
According to a study carried out for the EPA in 1985, American Viscose had a
basic but essentially ineffective waste-water treatment facility in place prior to
1946. Relying on limestone beds, the treatment was inadequate to neutralize
acid waste or remove a host of other contaminants.171 However, the study does
not indicate whether the limestone beds were in use from the outset or installed
later. A different study completed for the EPA in 2000 states that ―waste
streams produced during rayon manufacturing at the site were discharged
directly to the Shenandoah River prior to 1948.‖172 The statement is inaccurate
on the surface—waste treatment and diversion are known to have occurred
previously—though it does reflect the essential ineffectiveness of the early
attempts at treatment.
The first clear statement in American Viscose documents regarding waste
treatment systems at the Front Royal plant173 appeared in February 1942 in a
report written by Mr. E. Roetman. Roetman was a specialist overseeing waste
treatment plants at all of AVC‘s factories and worked out of AVC‘s Engineering
Acid Reclaim department in the 1940s. The note about Glauber’s salt comes from Versar, Inc. ―Avtex
Fibers Responsible Party Search and Financial Assessment: Draft Final Report, Prepared for U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. January 29, 1985.‖ Avtex Administrative Record. EPA.
http://loggerhead.epa.gov/arweb/ public/ pdf/136013.pdf (accessed May 6, 2009), 3.
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Department at central headquarters in Philadelphia, PA.174 The report, titled
―Progress Report on Trade Waste Treatment at Front Royal, ‗Sulfide Waste,‘‖
described a ―leak of extremely strong acid‖ into the wastewater treatment plant.
The acid destroyed the biological action of the plant‘s trickling filter, used to
treat sulfide wastes.
Another early reference to the plant‘s waste treatment system came from
John H. Mallinson, a staff engineer who worked for AVC from 1941 to 1979. He
described the early treatment of acid waste. The facility installed a Dorr
clarifier in 1946 that separated calcium sulfate and zinc hydroxide from the
effluent. Prior to that, however, acid waste simply filtered through two
chambers filled with calcium hydroxide. From there, it flowed straight into the
river. The effluent was not adequately cleaned, according to Mallinson, because
the calcium hydroxide was not changed frequently, thus the effluent would not
be neutralized in the river for ―five or six days.‖ He took his concerns to the
plant manager in 1943 and was told that ―it was none of [his] business, to stay
off.‖175
A December 1943 report, titled ―Neutralization of Waste Acid‖ and
addressed to seven AVC managers at company headquarters, corroborated the
problems with the waste acid treatment system. The report emphasized with
concern that acid waste from the Front Royal plant ―will be greatly increased‖
by wartime expansion of the plant to produce high tenacity rayon. It notes the
importance of neutralizing the wastes before they enter the Shenandoah ―to
render them as harmless as possible.‖ However, previous attempts using the
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limestone rooms that Mallinson described had limited efficacy: the surface area
of the limestone was too small and quickly became coated by viscose fibers
mixed in the acid waste. In addition, ―the volume and velocity‖ of waste
entering the chamber overwhelmed the system‘s capacity. The report
concluded: ―Successful treatment has never been obtained.‖176
In addition to Roetman‘s 1942 report on AVC‘s acid waste, he wrote a
second progress report on the same date discussing treatment of the alkaline
waste produced at Front Royal. The engineers had examined sediments on the
bottom of the South Fork, finding that ―a large part of it‖ was ―precipitated
cellulose,‖ likely exiting the plant from the viscose sewer. This heavy cellulose,
with its high BOD load, originated with the Cerini process that separated
cellulose from caustic soda. It is unclear whether, at the time of this report, all
waste viscose passed through the viscose sewer into the river. Herman Stuhr
made clear that the facility had no means of reclaiming waste viscose.
Particularly during World War II, the volumes of waste viscose exiting the plant
made it ―completely impractical to even attempt this.‖ Charles Leadman noted
that the American Viscose plant in Nitro, WV did reclaim some waste viscose,
but the Front Royal plant ―never reclaimed any viscose at all. Never had the
equipment to do it.‖177
As of 1943, AVC‘s primary mode of waste viscose disposal involved
dumping the material into unlined pits on the far side of the railroad tracks.
According to Richard Almy, a mechanical engineer at American Viscose, during
176

Sterner, R.R. ―Neutralization of Waste Acid, December 9, 1943,‖ 1-2; DEQ Documents,
SWCB/DEQ v. Avtex Fibers (Front Royal), American Viscose Documents – 1942-1949; Avtex Fibers
records, CN 37962; LVASRC.
177

―Testimony of Herman F. Stuhr,‖ 53; ―Testimony of Charles Leadman,‖ 31.

82
the war ―there was an almost continuous process of digging new basins. It
became full quite rapidly, particularly in the instance of a power failure or
major flood, which would generate tons and maybe hundreds of tons of waste‖
and fill up a basin.178 Although no War Production Board documents make
mention of chemical waste disposal, the agency assisted with dumping waste
viscose, including purchasing buggies for transporting waste to the dumping
pits. The convenience and speed of this disposal practice fit well with wartime
need—it was a quick, easy way to get the materials out of sight and out of mind.
Two chemical engineers who worked on water treatment at AVC in the
late 1940s noted the role of World War II in worsening pollution from the
American Viscose facility. In an article in VIW & SWA News, a publication
dealing with water and sewage issues in the northern Shenandoah Valley, B.N.
Scheuer and C.W. Joseph explain several problems related to American Viscose
water‘s treatment system. The war was a primary issue:
If World War II had not occurred, this problem would have been
solved much sooner than it was; not only were many of the
technically trained employees called into the armed forces, but the
company was ordered in favor of the war effort to expand its
production facilities and manufacture new yarns by unfamiliar
processes. The problems of this expansion demanded the full time
service of the remaining technical manpower. These conditions
coupled with a general shortage of men and materials precluded
the development of a process and the installation of a plant for the
treatment of the acidic waste.179
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The article went on to acknowledge the facility‘s problem with waste and
their difficulties discovering effective ways to deal with it. Their ultimate
conclusion, however, was that the most effective tools for protecting the South
Fork from pollution were dry dumps (i.e. the pits of waste viscose and other
lagoons), fly ash lagoons, and the waste treatment plant. To the chemists of
1950, these constituted ―a successful method for the treatment of ‗all of the
waste all of the time,‘… facilities for safe-guarding the Shenandoah from
pollution.‖ Much of the theory behind American Viscose‘s early waste-disposal
procedures had roots in old concepts. Pouring waste products into lagoons
allowed dewatering ―by percolation through the ground and evaporation.‖
Remaining effluent discharged into the South Fork would be ―easily assimilated
by the river.‖ 180
The tone of Scheuer and Joseph‘s article is both celebratory and
defensive, likely written in part in an attempt to improve public relations. They
wrote the piece for a local audience roughly five years after the end of the war.
The Shenandoah had been essentially dead—smelly, foamy, and milky white—
causing frustration and complaint from neighbors, but the engineers noted that
conditions were improving. The authors‘ praise of AVC‘s new wastewater
treatment plant, however, obscured an important piece of history: the company
had been ordered to build the treatment plant in 1948 by Virginia‘s newlyformed State Water Control Board (SWCB).181
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Chapter 5
Shifting Dynamics and Polluted Consequences

Wastewater treatment at American Viscose did not significantly improve
until after July 1, 1946, when Virginia Governor William Munford Tuck signed
the State Water Control Law, one of the first comprehensive statewide efforts to
control water pollution in the country. The law required the governor to develop
a citizen board, with a mission to ―protect existing water quality, to reduce and
prevent water pollution, and to restore and maintain state waters to a quality
that would protect human health and aquatic life.‖ Unfortunately, it was a
weak law with no enforcement mechanism, thus ―manufacturers were under no
legal obligation to make the [pollution] reductions.‖182 Nevertheless, it marked
the first steps toward official protection of the South Fork.
The law was one in a series of events marking a slow shift in dynamics
between the river and the factory. These changes illustrate many themes of
environmental history, including the role of sportsmen in preservation of
natural systems, changing attitudes toward science and technology in the postwar years, and the steady unfolding of knowledge regarding the environmental
and health impacts of certain chemicals. In Front Royal, requirements of the
1946 Water Control Law exposed some of the limits of this knowledge as
engineers dealt with chemicals whose aquatic impacts were unknown. The law
also marked the beginning of American Viscose‘s friction with regulatory
agencies as the company focused on minimizing blame instead of harm.
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Throughout, consequences of the plant‘s continuing technological momentum
to aquatic life in the South Fork continued to unfold, outpacing the ability and
the determination of the company to prevent them.
In the years immediately following World War II, new and powerful allies
came to the aid of the South Fork. As the intense focus on the war receded, the
consequences of American Viscose‘s massive production operations on the river
were evident, and there was room again in the political sphere for conversations
about industrial harms. Beginning immediately after the war, changes in
leisure time shifted some of the ways in which the river was used, bringing
more people to it for recreational purposes. The tangible impacts of the
chemical discharge from AVC‘s rayon plant caused grave concern among
visitors to the Shenandoah and downstream residents. In 1947, despite the
company‘s efforts to improve waste treatment, the milky appearance of the
river—caused by viscose wastes and overflow from the plant‘s cooling tower—
was still visible from the highway bridge en route to Winchester, some thirty-six
miles by river from American Viscose,183 and even further downstream. A
company memo mentioned that a Winchester resident had complained multiple
times to AVC headquarters in Philadelphia.184 Another memo from the same
time period stated that ―the condition of the river below our plant has so
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incensed the public that pressure is being placed on the State Water Control
Board for action.‖185
Fortunately for the Shenandoah, some of those neighbors and visitors
included sport fishermen with connections to the most politically powerful men
in Virginia. Their efforts, organized under the auspices of the Izaak Walton
League of America (IWLA), led to the passage of Virginia‘s 1946 State Water
Control law.186 The Virginia division of the Izaak Walton League boasted the
nation‘s most famous fisherman of that era: President Herbert Hoover, an active
member of the Orange County Chapter. The influential Virginia Senator A.
Willis Robertson was also a League member, leading the effort to pass the
Federal Aid and Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937 (better known as the PittmanRobertson Act) that finances wildlife conservation, research, and acquisition of
wildlife management areas into the present day.187
The IWLA was a major political force nationwide. Founded in 1922, it
grew rapidly into America‘s largest conservation organization with 100,000
members by the late 1920s.188 Politically, the Izaak Walton League pushed for
protection of both wildlife and water quality. The organization had significant
political success at the federal level in the 1930s, successfully lobbying for some
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public works funds to be used for sewers and sewage treatment plants, as well
as sealing old mines. The IWLA sponsored federal pollution control bills, one of
which passed Congress in 1939 but was vetoed by President Roosevelt who
argued that it was too expensive.189
Within five years of its founding, IWLA members were politically active
and effective in Virginia. By 1928, the League was credited with making
―insistent demands‖ for control of stream pollution and stirring up increased
public interest in the issue. The IWLA had a seat on the cooperative committee
formed to survey and study stream pollution along with representatives from
industry, the health department, the game and inland fisheries commission and
others. 190 In 1929, the group partnered with the Garden Clubs of Virginia and
the Virginia Academy of Science to petition for establishment of what would
become the Virginia State Park system. In 1940, the IWLA‘s Arlington-Fairfax
Chapter won statewide adoption of a fish and wildlife law enforcement
program.191 By the end of World War II, the League was clearly a respected part
of the political landscape in Virginia and an active advocate for conservation.
As a sportsmen‘s organization, the Izaak Walton League had a strong
connection to the Shenandoah River. Prior to 1940, the river was ―a Mecca for
fishermen‖ and one of the best smallmouth bass fisheries in the east.192 With
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less interference from pollution during those pre-war years, the Shenandoah
River and its tributaries could provide varied habitats and food sources to
support a multiplicity of aquatic life. The river‘s great sinuous meanders
through the Valley contributed to structural variety within the river, creating a
diversity of habitat niches. Deep pools of slow water were interspersed with
multiple riffles—shallower areas of choppy or ruffled water where the
smallmouth bass made their home. Meanders in the river molded the pattern
of riffles and pools, with deeper water often located along the river‘s concave
bank. The rocks underlying the river shaped its bends and contributed
boulders, cobbles, sediment, and ledges to form the river bottom. The erosive
interplay of ―scour and deposition‖ between river current and surrounding rock,
as well as periodic flood events, ensured that structural characteristics within
the river remained dynamic. Riparian trees, growing along the river‘s banks,
lent further heterogeneity to the river bed by contributing their trunks, limbs,
and leaves.193 Such features provided habitat to a wide range of fish and other
aquatic organisms, each requiring niches within the river.
The relative purity of the pre-war Shenandoah River allowed riverine
energy cycles to function and support this diversity of aquatic organisms.
Energy entered the river system via aquatic plants—such as algae, mosses, and
vascular plants194—as well as terrestrial sources, including the leaves and limbs
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of riverside trees. Decomposition made plant matter available to other life
forms, ranging from microscopic organisms to myriad benthic
macroinvertebrates inhabiting the river bottom. Some river species digested
these plant materials, others feasted on detritus, while the carnivory species ate
one another. Higher up in the food webs, the Shenandoah River‘s diverse fish
species ate smaller organisms and one another. In addition to the small- and
largemouth bass favored by sport fishermen, darters, eels, sunfish, chub, trout,
carp, catfish, darters, crappies, dace, and many more species inhabited
multiple niches within the river‘s habitat structures and food webs.195
Such a brief sketch of the Shenandoah River‘s ecology falls far short of
conveying the remarkable multiplicity of species and their intermingled food
webs and habitat requirements. Demonstrating the layers of complexity in
riverine ecology, two biologists noted that even a seemingly simple organism like
biofilm, ―the slippery film on the surface of [river] rocks, [is] ―an entire
ecosystem within itself.‖ Beyond the obvious question of food availability,
innumerable other factors affected riverine life and health. For example, water
turbidity, temperature and pH, as well as concentrations of various nutrients
and availability of dissolved oxygen could all determine whether particular
species thrived, survived, or disappeared. The river‘s non-human history, its
change over time, emerged out of interactions and relationships between all
parts of the Shenandoah River ecosystem—from the smallest bacteria to the
watershed‘s broad landscape. The very intimacy of these interconnections was
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where the river escaped human control and limited the extent of human
understanding. In 2001, the two biologists noted that associations between
some components of the river‘s ecology are still ―poorly understood.‖196
As the country emerged from World War II, it became clear that the
polluted effluent from American Viscose had severed these complex riverine
relationships in the Shenandoah downstream of the plant. Surveys by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service found ―practically no fish in the river and almost a
complete destruction of bottom animals (fish food such as mayfly nymphs,
caddis fly larvae, and hellgrammites).‖197 The Izaak Walton League‘s chapter in
Berryville, Virginia—located just a few miles west of the Shenandoah River—
took the lead in pressuring the Virginia General Assembly to clean up the river
and curtail American Viscose‘s toxic effluent. A brief 1946 article in the IWLA
newspaper, Outdoor America, credited the chapter‘s founder, H. Blackburn
Moore, as being ―largely responsible for drafting the legislation and steering it to
successful passage… almost without opposition by the last Virginia legislature.‖
The chapter sought to follow up this victory by securing IWLA representation on
the State Water Control Board (SWCB) that the Governor of Virginia was in the
process of appointing.198 The Board‘s mission was to ―protect existing water
quality, to reduce and prevent water pollution, and to restore and maintain
state waters to a quality that would protect human health and aquatic life.‖199
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Edgar Blackburn ―Blackie‖ Moore—of unknown relation to H. Blackburn
Moore—served as the Delegate representing Berryville in the Virginia General
Assembly from 1933-1967, including a seventeen-year tenure as Speaker of the
House. An extremely influential Democratic politician, Moore held a seat on the
SWCB from its creation in 1946 until 1970, chairing the board for most of that
time period.200 It seems likely that Delegate Moore played an important role in
passing the 1946 law. Although his relationship to the IWLA‘s H. Blackburn
Moore is unclear, their similar names, Berryville addresses, and mutual interest
in water quality suggest a close familial tie and likely political cooperation.
E. Blackburn Moore surfaces once, dramatically, in the American Viscose
documents, hinting at the multilinear development of water quality law in
Virginia and the potential for one person to significantly influence
interpretations of law. In a memo dated October 10, 1947, AVC engineer T.F.
Brastown described a visit to Richmond to meet with ―Mr. Hedgepeth,‖ an
engineer employed as the Executive Secretary of the Virginia State Water
Control Board. They arrived in Richmond to find Hedgepeth very upset. He
had met ―that same morning‖ with the Chairman of the SWCB, Mr. E.
Blackburn Moore, who told him that he ―could no longer discuss results or
data, make any commitments, or venture any opinion as to what was adequate
treatment or as to whether results were satisfactory. All cases would have to
appear before the WCB, and they would be the judges of what constituted
pollution.‖ In addition, Moore interpreted the law to say that wastes from new
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facilities or expanded production could not be grandfathered into existing waste
streams but ―must be completely treated so as to carry no pollution load.‖201
Moore‘s instructions did not sit well with Hedgepeth who told the AVC
engineers that ―this was not the type of job he had taken, and that if the policy
continued the WCB did not need an engineer, but only lawyers.‖ He continued,
saying that ―if the activities of the Board become influenced by politics,
pollution control is dead.‖202 The memo opens more questions than it answers
about the contrast between Hedgepeth‘s philosophy and Moore‘s, but it offers a
glimpse into the conflicts of interpretation and action surrounding early official
attempts to regulate waste and protect water. The forces that shaped water
pollution control were contingent and cultural human responses to the state of
the river.
Within American culture, sportsmen—usually fishermen and hunters—in
the Izaak Walton League and other sporting organizations came from a long
tradition of conservation ethics and initiatives. Scholar John F. Reiger traces
the origins of environmental conservation to ―American sportsmen, those who
hunted and fished for pleasure rather than for commerce or necessity.‖
Although sporting clubs have a long history in the U.S., dating back to 1732, a
sense of widespread group identity emerged later, in the years following the
Civil War. National sporting newspapers—American Sportsman, Forest and
Stream, and Field and Stream—helped created a sense of belonging to a group
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with a defined and shared code of ethics: ―true sportsmen practice proper
etiquette in the field, give game a sporting chance, and possess an aesthetic
appreciation of the whole environmental context of sport that included a
commitment to its perpetuation.‖203
The years following the Civil War also saw new public support for
creation and enforcement of policies protecting fish and wildlife. Westward
expansion, railroads, and industrialization were rapidly depleting wildlife,
streams, and forests. The year 1873 found Forest and Stream editor Charles
Hallock articulating a platform similar to that espoused by the Izaak Walton
League decades later:
protection of watersheds and scientific management of forests;
establishment of uniform game laws dictated by geography,
habitat, and migration patterns, rather than judicial accident;
creation of a science and industry of fish culture that would
develop new strains of game fish and restock depleted waters;
abatement of water pollution…204
A ―club movement‖ of anglers and hunters began in the 1870s to address these
problems. They formed clubs and associations at local, state, and national
levels focusing on issues like game-protection and fish culture laws. In 1874,
William F. Parker, editor of American Sportsman celebrated ―the sportsmen of
America [who] are banding themselves together for the purpose of checking and
controlling the wanton and wasteful destruction of nature‘s best gifts intended
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for the heritage of universal man, and not for the benefit of the reckless and
greedy few.‖ By 1878, Hallock counted hundreds of such clubs in the U.S.205
If sporting clubs helped generate a sense of identity and a venue for
action, the private sphere, in which codes and traditions of ethical conduct were
passed down between family members, remained important for shaping
connections to the natural world. Many of the leading figures in conservation,
from Thoreau to Pinchot, Leopold to Theodore Roosevelt, describe hunting and
fishing both alone and with family and friends as key to their interest in the
natural world. For many, ―the pursuit of wildlife seems to have provided the
crucial first contact with the natural world that spawned a commitment to its
perpetuation.‖206 Two of those early leaders, Teddy Roosevelt and George Bird
Grinnell, founded the Boone and Crocket Club in 1887. Reiger credits this as
the first private organization to deal with national conservation issues
effectively, predating John Muir‘s Sierra Club.207
Reiger makes an important point that, even in the 1800s, interest in
conservation measures originated in the upper classes. In general, these were
people who did not need to hunt and fish to survive but could approach the
activity as a leisure pastime. Publications frequently carried descriptions of
conflicts between the angler wanting to protect his favorite fishing hole and the
commercial fisherman, an early version of the ―jobs versus the environment‖
debate. This trend is evident in Virginia in the 1930s and ‗40s with powerful
political figures from the state‘s patrician class invested in protection of the
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Shenandoah‘s water quality for fishing. Nevertheless, interest in the natural
world grew among broader swaths of the American population in the 20th
century. The 1928 stream survey, which the IWLA helped to initiate, cited
increased public interest in stream quality as one justification for the study.
They speculated that more people were getting out to the country due to an
increase in road building, and more travelers came to rural Virginia because of
advertising of the state‘s historical and recreational sites.208
Interest in wildlife also began to shift following World War II, especially as
suburban sprawl despoiled the countryside. Public pressure from scientists
and citizens led to changes at the federal Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife
(SFW), which in 1974 became the Fish and Wildlife Service. Segments of the
urban and suburban population sought opportunities to ―watch wild animals in
the wild,‖ not to hunt them. Surveys recorded millions of Americans
participating in bird watching, nature walks, and nature photography.
Meanwhile, scientists pushed the SFW to extend preservation efforts beyond
fish and game to endangered species.209
Despite these shifts, sports fishermen and hunters continued to play
important roles in conservation in the postwar years. In some instances,
members of the ―hook and bullet‖ groups could make headway on pollution
abatement where ―bird and bunny boys‖ and concerned housewives were more
easily marginalized.210 Automotive giant Ford‘s River Rouge production complex
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caused tremendous air and water pollution of the community of Dearborn,
Michigan and the Rouge River.211 Remarkably (from today‘s perspective),
complaints about the pollution came not just from Ford‘s neighbors but also
from their employees. Despite massive air pollution problems, water pollution
received the most attention due to the involvement of sportsmen. In Michigan,
customers, employees, and plant managers alike tended to hunt and fish and
thus shared a common interest and respect. Cooperative efforts resulted in
modest strengthening of the state‘s water quality law in 1949 and slow
improvements in pollution abatement by Ford.212
Sportsmen in various states played a key role in an important water
quality dispute nearly a decade later in 1957. The 1956 amendments to the
federal Water Pollution Control Act strengthened the federal government‘s
ability to enforce water pollution regulations in instances of interstate pollution.
At the request of a state pollution control agency, the federal government could
pursue an abatement suit, and if public health was endangered, the
government no longer had to receive the consent of all States involved.213 The
first use of this law came at the instigation of sport fishermen in Louisiana. In
much of the U.S., a state public health department oversaw water quality
issues. In Louisiana, however, that responsibility resided with the state fish
and game agency. As a result, the health of aquatic life became an important
indicator for pollution problems. In this case, sportsmen‘s activity in centered
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around ―ad hoc advocacy groups‖ rather than national organizations like the
IWLA, but, with authority based in long traditions of ―common access to fish
and game,‖ they effectively exerted pressure at local, state, and national
political levels.214
Sportsmen played a mediating role, not only between levels of
government and various economic interests, but also between old and new
conservation values. Sportsmen wanting to protect the Shenandoah and other
rivers exerted a different kind of force, based on their uses of the river and their
perspectives on its importance. Although fishermen engaged in a type of
extraction, it was non-industrial, based on enjoyment and enmeshed in a
system of values that emphasized protecting both the fish as a species and the
river as their natural habitat. The momentum of conservation grew in volume
and intensity in the postwar years, picking up other concerns that went beyond
protection of wildlife habitat and water quality.
The efforts of sportsmen, regulators, and other early post-war
conservationists, however, did not generally seek to undermine business
interests, and those with concerns about industrial activity kept a low profile.
Facing a national ―consensus‖ following World War II that encouraged patriotic
conformity, respect for authority, and ―a commitment to a vague notion of an
American way of life defined by prosperity, material comfort, and a secure
home,‖ dissenters faced the threat of being labeled disloyal, or worse,
Communists. 215 Scientists‘ role in creating successful wartime technologies led
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to an unprecedented leap in funding for research and development from
government and industry, reaching ―levels unheard of for any profession in the
history of the United States.‖216 Overall, America emerged from World War II
with an uncritical commitment to technology and innovation provided by
benevolent corporations. DuPont‘s slogan ―better things for better living...
through chemistry‖ had a literal meaning.217
This friendliness toward business and industry was evident in the way
that regulators approached water quality protection. Corporations took a ―goslow‖ approach, pacing out improvements to their waste disposal practices to
limit impacts on their profits. Regulators and plant engineers had tacit
agreements to work together behind the scenes, usually without legal pressure
or public input, in order to protect the national reputation of the corporation.218
The situation at American Viscose in Front Royal mimicked this scenario.
Memos clearly demonstrate that AVC engineers, both at the Front Royal waste
treatment plant and at the company headquarter in Philadelphia, worked
closely with the Virginia State Water Control Board. In return, Mr. Hedgepeth,
the SWCB‘s lead engineer, stated ―that his office was assuming that industry is
honest and competent and will accept reports‖ made by AVC at face value.219
Although the Clean Water Act of 1972 gives the Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
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significantly more regulatory authority, the current system in place today
reflects that friendliness to business and remains largely self-monitoring;
companies design their own pollution control systems and collect their own
samples. Ralph Bolgiano, the State Water Control Board regional biologist who
monitored Avtex‘s permits during its final years, explained that the current
approach ―wasn‘t always the best thing for the environment, but legally, it was
the way it was set up.‖ He noted that the system could work effectively: ―it has
some advantages. Most people live up to your expectations of them… You give
some people the autonomy to do things the way they want to do them, and if
they care at all, they‘ll probably do a better job.‖220
A variety of events and cultural trends converged in the decades following
World War II to undermine the pro-technology consensus in the U.S. and build
a critical debate about industrial environmental harms. Whereas sportsmen
had access to power and the type of social authority necessary to challenge
pollution in the years immediately following the war, other voices slowly gained
a place in the public sphere. Rachel Carson‘s transformative voice might have
entered the debate sooner; her concern about man‘s impact to the natural
world intensified following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945. Her research into the impacts from chemical pesticides began in the
1950s, yet in part because of the national attitude toward science and
technology, she waited to publish her findings until 1962. By then, various
national and global health scares were undermining popular perceptions of
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industrial benevolence: strontium-90 from above ground nuclear tests appeared
in milk and caused cancer in children; the carcinogenic herbicide aminotriazole
entered the food supply despite government regulation; and the flu medicine
thalidomide led to tragic birth defects.221 All of these raised questions about the
unqualified dependability of scientific discoveries.
These events and Carson‘s book raised questions within certain scientific
communities and challenged them to take a more public and active role. A
1962 Ecological Society of America report stated: ―Silent Spring created a tide of
opinion which will never again allow professional ecologists to remain
comfortably aloof from public responsibility.‖ The ecologists realized the
necessity of providing an ―authoritative voice‖ to citizens and policymakers.
―Popular ecologists‖ like Rachel Carson, Aldo Leopold, and others used the
vocabulary of ecology to critique modern science and technology and build ―a
moral case about the proper relationship between society and nature.‖ Their
language and ideas found resonance among a public watching increasingly
serious environmental harms unfold. Meanwhile, professionals within the
discipline of ecology retained a deep connection to modern science, the militaryindustrial complex, and a managerial perspective toward natural systems.222
This approach proved useful in appealing to many Congressional leaders
interested in pollution control and concerned about the public anger over
environmental degradation.
The public fear and anger that drove the passage of new water quality
protection and toxic waste remediation laws expanded as examples of
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environmental harm became more visible and had a more personal impact.
Previous conservation activists tended to be drawn from groups like the IWLA
and National Wildlife Federation, the Garden Club of America, outdoor and
wilderness enthusiasts with the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, as well as
a smattering of scientists.223 Environmental conservation in the late 1960s and
‗70s, however, grew into a widespread public concern that resulted in much
stronger laws protecting water quality.
The factors feeding into this increased environmental concern were
numerous. Part of the cause, as articulated by historian Tom McCarthy, was
simply that ―when industrial pollution got bad it affected someone‘s pursuit of
‗the good life‘ and people complained.‖224 Sportsmen complained sooner
because their ―pursuit of the ‗good life‘‘‖ put them in direct contact with
environmental degradation early on. More widespread outrage about industrial
pollution occurred as it affected more of the population. The growing network
of roads and more widespread availability of automobiles opened the
countryside and wilderness to Americans. Interest in outdoor recreation
increased dramatically after WWII with the availability of ―cheap unrationed
gasoline, higher living standards, and paid vacations.‖225 A report to the
Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, however, found that ―water
pollution [was] diminishing the number of recreation waters‖ for swimming and

223

Mark Harvey, ―Loving the Wild in Postwar America,‖ in American Wilderness: A New History,
ed. by Michael Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 198. In addition to advocating for national
and state parks, the Garden Club of America also pursued educational programs about the danger of aerial
pest control. See Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from
World War I to Silent Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 214.
224

McCarthy, 111.

225

Harvey, 187-188.

102
boating as well as fishing and waterfowl hunting.226 Thus, while outdoor
excursions and experiences sparked a greater interest in nature, they also
exposed more Americans to polluted landscapes.
Likewise, car culture facilitated the expansion of human dwellings into
the countryside. Suburbanization was an important part of post-war culture,
spurred on by a housing shortage and increased demand for housing. During
the war, the U.S. government urged citizens to save money and invest in war
bonds as a patriotic duty to support the war effort and prepare for a post-war
economy. Even before the war ended, advertisers promoted a post-war
consumer culture: according to a Royal typewriter ad, ―what this war is all
about [is the right to] once more walk into any store in the land and buy
anything you want.‖227 The suburban single-family home topped the list of
desirable consumer items and was promoted by government and industry in
hopes that it (and appliances to fill it) would be a ―pump primer for the postwar
economy,‖ preventing a return of the pre-war economic depression.228 The
success of this vision could be seen in vast single-family suburbs such as
Lakewood Park and Levittown.
In suburban landscapes, however, environmental degradation often
became personal. In historian Adam Rome‘s words, ―the bulldozer was never
far from the living room,‖ and in that intimate space, the destructive nature of
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post-war industry intruded into the comfortable world of post-war prosperity.
Life in the suburbs exposed Americans to a range of environmental ills,
including the disappearance of wildlife and scenic countryside as land was
cleared and leveled for development. In addition, building in environmentally
sensitive areas meant homeowners had to deal with problems like erosion and
flooding.229
As for water pollution, Rome observes that that more Americans may
have become attuned to the need for water quality protection due to living with
a septic system in the suburbs than from observing industrial pollution in
rivers and streams. Rapid suburban construction far away from centralized
sewer systems required the use of septic tanks. Unplanned growth and
problems with siting and design led to frequent system failures and
contamination of streams, groundwater, and eventually drinking water.
Synthetic laundry detergents also escaped into the environment via septic
systems, appearing not just as suds in wells and tap water but also in rivers
and lakes, sometimes forming ―floating mountains of foam.‖230
By the early 1960s, personal fears of drinking water contamination and
health impacts from chemicals made water pollution an issue for millions of
Americans who might otherwise have paid little attention.231 The public outcry
spurred passage of increasingly strong water quality protection laws. Indeed,
during the debate surrounding the 1972 Clean Water Act, a Republican official
in Long Island contacted President Nixon‘s staff to express strong support for
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the law; his locality‘s rapid population growth was seriously exacerbating
pollution of groundwater by leaking septic systems. 232 Polluting industries and
politicians were both discovering that ―any industrial firm that crossed
purposes with the American homeowner‘s conception of ‗home, sweet home‘
risked messing with a force more powerful than itself.‖233
Growing media attention also contributed to support for stronger
environmental protections. The environment became a significant topic for
news coverage in the 1960s, with the annual number of stories on the subject
reaching an initial peak around 1970.234 During the postwar years, the number
of households with a television skyrocketed. In 1950, 9% of U.S. households
had a television. By 1955, the number jumped to 64.5%. Ten years later,
92.6% of households had television, and by 1972, the year the Clean Water Act
became law, that number was 95.8%235
The visual power of television also brought news of environmental harms
and disasters into American living rooms. The Santa Barbara oil spill in
January of 1969, followed by the Cuyahoga River fire a few months later, were
powerful visible symbols of ―the ability of modern industry to turn the grace and
beauty of nature into something grotesque.‖236 Wider availability of newspapers
and other print media likewise increased knowledge of environmental problems
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occurring in other parts of the country and the world. Mainstream media often
picked up news stories first covered by the publications of sportsmen‘s and
conservation organizations. A New York Times editorial opposing aerial
pesticide spraying in 1958 helped to bring that issue to public attention. Even
before Silent Spring, articles voicing concern about pesticide spraying appeared
in widely-read publications like Reader’s Digest, Life, and Saturday Evening
Post. Even Sports Illustrated covered the topic, showing the clear interest
among mainstream media in exploring these issues.237
Years later, beginning in 1978, TV broadcasts and print media showed
dioxin and other toxic chemicals, with their attendant health impacts, leaching
into the homes and schools of residents in an upstate New York suburban
community built in the post-war years. The Love Canal tragedy spurred
another national outcry, this time in support of federal legislation to clean up
toxic waste.238 In 1980, President Carter signed into law the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), better
known as the Superfund Act.
Congress and the post-war Presidents responded to public fear and
anger over environmental pollution and its public health threats with varying
degrees of commitment. President Eisenhower, for example, referred to polluted
waters as ―a uniquely local blight‖ that should be dealt with accordingly.
Business owners, as well as local and state officials, welcomed this approach,
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and it was enshrined in the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act.239 This first
federal water quality law and its 1956 amendments lacked any federal
enforcement power and focused mostly on public health.240
The shift from this approach to the commitment of Senator Edmund
Muskie and his staff to steadily strengthen federal oversight of water quality
protection shows the political momentum building around protection of the
environment. Most important was the unveiling of industrial hazards combined
with increasing public awareness of environmental problems. In the
background, however, groups with no particular ―environmentalist‖ stripes—
from politicians seeking votes to local officials seeking ―pork‖ appropriations for
water control and water treatment projects—helped move federal water quality
laws forward. Likewise, the philosophy that shaped the 1972 Clean Water Act
was not based strictly on the holistic concerns of ―popular ecology‖ but
incorporated much from post-war professional science and systems thinking.241
By 1980, the federal government enacted a host of laws with the goals of,
among others, preventing water and air pollution, cleaning up toxic waste, and
protecting workplace health and safety: laws that would have tremendous
impact on the 440-acre site of the rayon plant in Front Royal. They would also
have broader implications, often leading to better methods of buffering the
public from environmental hazards rather than stopping them at the source.
Although the new environmental laws and regulations were
overwhelmingly beneficial overall, the ironies and unintended consequences of
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increased public concern for the natural environment were plentiful: people
pressed for a cleaner environment in part because new environment-harming
technologies like cars and roads allowed them to explore previously remote
areas and experience them more personally; likewise, suburban development
brought people into closer contact with nature while causing environmental
destruction. In other words, the new degree of public concern did not
necessarily recognize the depth of public complicity.
A somewhat similar set of ironies accompanied efforts to clean up
pollution. Unless pollution was stopped at the source—in other words, no
longer created—attempts to clean it almost always resulted in displacement of
the pollutants. For instance, adding scrubbers to the steel mill smokestacks in
Gary, Indiana to meet Clean Air Act guidelines significantly lowered airborne
emissions. Once removed, however, the particulate matter became a form of
toxic solid waste. No harmless form of hazardous pollution disposal exists—it
always impacts someone or some natural system. In Gary, the steel mill
management chose to dumped the ash near low-income communities,
particularly communities of color.242
The same phenomenon occurred with wastes that had previously been
disposed of in the water. Water pollution regulation resulted in a number of
corporations turning to landfilling techniques.243 Hooker Chemical‘s decision to
bury its chemical wastes at Love Canal was a common choice. The difference
between Hooker and American Viscose in this regard was that the former had to
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bury waste off-site while AVC had adequate space to landfill chemicals, like the
hydroxide sludge, on their own property. Nevertheless, toxics have a way of
escaping human control, and much of the hazardous material cleaned out of
AVC‘s acid and alkaline waste streams ended up back in the river.
American Viscose‘s troubles began early, following passage of the 1946
Virginia Water Control Act. In order to meet the new requirements, AVC
installed new technology to neutralize the acid discharges. The process first
involved mixing the alkaline, acid, and sanitary wastes coming from the plant in
a large storage pit. The alkaline chemicals immediately neutralized part of the
sulfuric acid and were ―completely neutralized‖ in return.244 The remaining
waste acid was mixed with lime slurry to complete the neutralization process.
The reaction between sulfuric acid and lime created a mix of calcium sulfate
and zinc hydroxide, a material that ―is perpetually the consistency of
toothpaste.‖ A Dorr filter, installed in September 1946 in response to the new
Virginia law, separated the calcium sulfate and zinc hydroxide from the
effluent.245 The sludge was pumped to waste lagoons along the river‘s edge for
final storage.246 By 1989, these sulfate/hydroxide basins covered roughly 85
acres and held an estimated 936,000 cubic yards of sludge.247
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Although Scheuer and Joseph celebrated this waste treatment system in
their 1950 article, and Scheuer published a scholarly paper about it in
February of 1948, AVC‘s waste treatment did not work particularly well in
practice. In October of 1947, the inadequacy of the system was causing serious
problems. The volume of waste, AVC engineer Roetman wrote, ―‖has
overwhelmed the plant.‖ The quantity of calcium sulfate sludge incessantly
clogged the vacuum filter meant to help separate it out of suspension. The
sludge piled up in the settling tank, and as a consequence, some calcium
sulfate consistently washed into the river, creating a milky appearance. In
addition, the equipment for introducing lime into the acid wastes had to
constantly operate at its maximum level, leaving ―no reserve capacity to take
care of the slugs of acid that frequently appear.‖248
Scheuer‘s article in Chemical Engineering revealed a willingness at
American Viscose to stretch or obscure the truth. The company considered a
response to the calcium sulfate build-up that reflects this attitude. Calcium
sulfate built up so quickly on every surface at the treatment plant that the
facility had to shut down weekly for cleaning. ―During the periodic shutdowns,‖
Roetman wrote, ―the waste enters the river untreated.‖ He continued,
demonstrating the corporation‘s attitude toward the Virginia law and suggesting
their past approach to the problem: ―As these occur at frequent intervals, they
cannot be passed off to the State as unforeseen accidents.‖ Roetman concluded
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that AVC must add more equipment and facilities to deal with the overloaded
treatment plant.249
Interestingly, the State Water Control Board engineer, L.L. Hedgepeth,
was also willing to cut corners. In November 1947, he offered AVC engineers
several suggestions to improve the appearance of the Shenandoah and thus
decrease complaints from the public. The suggestions dealt with cosmetic
issues rather than a serious effort to decrease waste or treat it more effectively.
He proposed changing the design of the outlet pipe to eliminate foaming when
the effluent went into the river. Multiple outlets into the South Fork,
Hedgepeth thought, might prevent so much concentration of waste on one side
of the river while mixing and diluting the ―off color‖ material more thoroughly in
the river water. Four or five outlets attached to separate sewers, he guessed,
should do the trick.250
Some of AVC‘s struggle with toxic waste disposal, however, seemed to
have been legitimately caused by a lack of knowledge about certain chemicals
and their impacts. In August of 1947, for example, five of AVC‘s engineers sat
down with the SWCB‘s Hedgepeth to discuss the company‘s application for a
state certificate allowing discharge of wastes into the Shenandoah River. Two
items on the agenda dealt with questions that neither the state official nor the
AVC engineers could immediately answer. Neither knew for certain the level of
B.O.D. in the cellulose bearing waste found on the river bottom or the duration
of its impact in the river. In addition, the group lacked knowledge regarding
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xanthates: sulfur compounds produced by the reaction of CS2 with white crumb
that was known to be toxic to aquatic life. The engineers‘ review of scientific
research did not locate a method for determining xanthate levels in their waste
stream. Hedgepeth promised to have the state look into both questions.251 An
AVC document from October of the same year reported that the engineers had
found a basic testing technique but could not guarantee its efficacy for locating
all xanthates. They could, however, state ―with certainty that sulphur
compounds exist in our waste etc.‖252
A 1948 memo showed American Viscose continuing to struggle with
scientific uncertainty. The company initiated independent testing through the
Institute of Textile Technology laboratory in Charlottesville, VA to see if the
plant‘s treatment process was adequate to prevent toxicity to aquatic life. Even
the experts at this lab did not have all the answers; they could determine ―the
effects of various wastes on fish life but at present cannot study the effects on
fish food.‖253 Despite these gaps in knowledge, however, the company
continued to produce both rayon and polluting waste at full capacity.
Richard Almy, who worked as plant engineer at American Viscose,
described another scenario from the early 1940s in which lack of knowledge
combined with war time urgency to create environmental havoc. Almy
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explained that no impervious clay liners were ever installed in the viscose pits,
hydroxide sludge lagoons, or other holding basins to minimize migration of
chemicals. Foremen received minimal instruction: ―get a bulldozer, go down
there and dig the soil up on the sides of the basin with laborers and a bulldozer,
make a road to it.‖ Almy acknowledged that the technology to make clay liners
was available at the time but stated that ―nobody, to my knowledge, ever
thought of the need for that sort of thing… We just dug a big hole and put the
waste products in it.‖ Speaking in 1990, Almy emphasized the change over
time in his understanding of waste disposal procedures: ―Of course in
retrospect that was a bad decision, but we were learning, like everybody else
was, about things like that. Now, that is a very bad thing to do, to dig a basin
and not line it.‖254
Despite increasing knowledge about chemical waste disposal in the years
following World War II, the engineers and managers at the rayon plant did not
take appreciable measures to correct problems. Indeed, a degree of stasis
seemed to hold sway at the rayon plant‘s waste treatment facility under all
three of its owners: American Viscose Corporation, FMC Corporation, and Avtex
Fibers, Inc. Despite the evident concern and efforts of some waste treatment
engineers, the procedures in use when Avtex purchased the plant in 1976 were
very similar to the process described by B.N. Scheuer in 1947. Modest changes
occurred along the way. In the early 1970s, the company built a carbon
disulfide recovery plant, and in 1974, began to reclaim zinc from the effluent
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stream.255 In 1983, under the direction of the EPA, Avtex began to run its
waste viscose through the wastewater treatment plant instead of landfilling it
on site.256 The company continued to use lagoons as part of their waste
treatment process; by the time the company closed, the viscose pits and waste
lagoons covered 220 acres, approximately half the site (see fig. 16).257
The largest basins were located along the banks of the South Fork with
only a modest dike separating toxic from aquatic. According to Ralph Bolgiano,
no waste materials ever really left the Avtex site: ―Everything that Avtex ever
removed from their waste stream, they just pumped it back into one of their
lagoons.‖258 Acid and alkaline wastes were mixed and neutralized in unlined
basins; the resulting hydroxide sludge went into six vast storage lagoons; and
fly ash from the power house piled up in five large landfills (see fig. 17). The
company could pay off fines when they violated the terms of their discharge
permit, but the Shenandoah suffered the consequences of the unlined lagoons
and waste viscose pits built to contain toxic wastes.
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Figure 16. Aerial view of the Avtex site, 1998. Many of the factory buildings on the left-hand side of
the picture have been demolished, but the unlined sulfate, fly ash, and waste viscose basins along the
South Fork remain filled with waste almost a decade after rayon production ceased. Source: U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, “Front Royal Virginia: Avtex Superfund Site Aerial Views - 1998,”
http://www.nao.usace.army.mil/projects/Environmental%20Projects/Avtex/AvtexAerials.asp
(accessed July 7, 2010).

115
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The problem of unlined waste lagoons brings us back to the deeper
history of the river, rooted in the geological formations beneath the Avtex site.
The site is underlain with bedrock of the Ordovician-age Martinsburg
Formation, a sedimentary rock type composed mostly of ―alternating layers of
shale and lithic sandstone, and minor limestone interbeds.‖ These rocks can be
found in various parts of the Valley, mostly associated with the Massanutten
Synclinorium. A synclinorium is ―different from mere synclines because they
are more complicated: the overall synclinal shape is ‗decorated‘ with numerous
smaller anticlines and synclines.‖259 The simplest explanation of anticlines and
synclines is to say that they are rocks pushed together by opposing tectonic
pressures into curved folds. A syncline, like the Massanutten formation, is a
downward arc, like a bowl; the edges of the bowl are pushed upward while the
competing pressures force the inner rocks downward. In the case of
Massanutten, two long ridges of sandstone are the edges of the bowl with Fort
Valley as the downward arc. Although millennia of erosion and weathering
reshaped the rocks, traces of the Synclinorium and mountain building
processes remain. Although Front Royal is separated from modern day
Massanutten mountain, this major landscape feature still impacts surrounding
areas as the lower level sedimentary rocks were uplifted as the Synclinorium
formed.
Toxic materials from the unlined pits and lagoons on the Avtex site
migrated through the ―minor limestone interbeds‖ in the shale bedrock. Rock
formations directed the leakage in different directions, but some ended up in
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the South Fork. In the late 1980s, a neighbor of the plant and former Avtex
employee, described ―the place where…the river dies. ‗You won‘t see a frog, a
bug, a bird…‘ Gaseous bubbles come up from the bottom of the placid
stream.‖260 Bolgiano explained the source of the bubbles releasing from the
sulfate lagoons into underground cracks in the rock:
in the middle of the river, you could see places where everything
would be nice and green, the water would look great, and then
you‘d see a little rock stick up there. It‘d have a white hole in it,
and the white was some bacteria or fungus that was capable of
utilizing the sulphur… There‘d be water coming out which, if you
put your finger in the hole and jiggled it around, it‘d be black
because it would be sulfite down there before it hit the [river]
water with oxygen in it… It‘d be black, sticky, rotten-egg smell and
so forth. You could find these on the river bottom, hundreds of
yards – hundreds and hundreds of yards – from the lagoons.261
A significant portion of the underground pollutant stream did not,
however, go directly into the South Fork. A smaller anticline (formed when
competing tectonic pressures push rocks upward into an arched shape) in the
bedrock beneath Avtex formed a kind of tube extending beneath the South Fork
of the Shenandoah, providing ―important structural control on the movement of
the dense carbon disulfide plume.‖262 This wave of pollution originated beneath
the three newer waste viscose pits, filled between 1958-1983. The pits were
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probably excavated ―close to, if not into, bedrock,‖ and contain a total of 9.8
million cubic feet of viscose sludge.263
The chemical reaction that allows cellulose to be regenerated into rayon
also caused the carbon disulfide plume of contamination in the groundwater.
Mixing ―white crumb‖ with carbon disulfide to produce sodium cellulose
xanthate (―yellow crumb‖) is a reversible reaction. When left to age, waste
viscose steadily releases carbon disulfide. In the waste basins, the CS2 took an
aqueous form as rainwater percolated through the viscose.264 In addition, plant
engineers used fly ash from the plant‘s coal-fired boilers to build berms
between some of the viscose pits. The berms, in turn, leached chemicals that
interacted with the waste viscose to form arsenic.265 All of the chemicals
eventually entered and contaminated the groundwater.
The anticline prevented the contamination from spreading widely.
Instead, it channeled the material under the river and directly into the wells of
the neighborhood across the river from Avtex. In 1980, the regional engineer
for the SWCB noticed that many residents of Rivermont Acres were purchasing
water treatment systems for their wells.266 State agencies investigated and
found the groundwater polluted by an alphabet soup of chemicals: ―arsenic,
cadmium, carbon disulfide, chloride, iron, lead, manganese, phenols, sodium,
sulfate, hydrogen sulfide, and zinc,‖ with highest quantities of carbon disulfide
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and phenols.267 Although the chemical concentrations were not officially
considered carcinogenic by governmental agencies, former residents of
Rivermont Acres report a high incidence of cancers which developed at a young
age.268 Avtex did not deal with the source of the pollution problem. Instead,
the company simply purchased the majority of the Rivermont Acres
properties.269
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Chapter 6
Controlling Technological Momentum by Trial and Error: Efforts and Obstacles

From 1980 on, the cumulative problems associated with chemical waste
at the Front Royal rayon plant took on a momentum of their own, albeit a
disorganized momentum that moved in fits and starts. The final years of the
rayon plant saw remarkable fluctuations in power dynamics between a broad
cast of characters, including Avtex‘s Chairman John Gregg, the Commonwealth
of Virginia, the EPA, branches of the U.S. national security apparatus, and the
South Fork of the Shenandoah River. The numerous environmental laws
passed between 1946 and 1980 gave the state and federal governments a
variety of tools to try and knock the rayon plant out of its toxic slump. The
1946 State Water Control Law required American Viscose to curb its chemical
discharges into the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. A 1959 addition to
the law allowed the SWCB to levy a substantial fine against AVC after a major
fish kill in the South Fork. The 1972 Clean Water Act gave the state and
federal governments enforcement power to control discharge of pollutants into
surface waters. The EPA set water quality standards, delegating to the states
the responsibility of issuing and monitoring the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permits, which designated the specific amounts of
polluting chemicals that any facility can discharge.270
The discovery in 1980 of well-water contamination in the Rivermont
Acres community garnered Avtex increased attention from regulatory agencies.
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The EPA listed Avtex‘s 440 acres as a potential toxic site under the newlyenacted Superfund Act and began to study the facility in more depth. The
Superfund law empowered the EPA to identify contaminated sites, determine
liability, and enforce cleanup. In 1983, spurred on by evidence of carbon
disulfide, arsenic, and phenol contamination in the aquifer beneath the Avtex
site, the EPA added the company to its national priority list. As part of the
required remediation, Avtex enacted certain reforms. The company purchased
the homes in Rivermont Acres with contaminated wells. In addition, the plant‘s
wastewater treatment plant began to process waste viscose rather than
landfilling it and started pumping and treating groundwater in an attempt to
contain chemical migration. The remediation efforts were insufficient to keep
the plant from official designation; Avtex became Virginia‘s largest Superfund
site in 1986.271
Violations of environmental laws were long a part of the company‘s
operating culture. In testimony before Congress, an EPA official stated that
Avtex violated the terms of its NPDES permit approximately 2,000 times
between 1980 and 1989. In November 1988, after repeated warnings and
citations, the Commonwealth of Virginia sued Avtex for $19.3 million for noncompliance with the NPDES permit.272 It is interesting to note that although
the state had a clear interest in pushing Avtex to clean up its act, it did not file
suit until pushed to do so by a citizen lawsuit against Avtex. Under the Clean
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Water Act, citizens can sue polluters directly, and in October 1988, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a notice of intent to sue ―because of the
slow pace of state officials.‖ The state responded with their own lawsuit against
Avtex within a month, superseding the NRDC action.273
Upon hearing of the Commonwealth of Virginia‘s lawsuit, Avtex‘s
Chairman, John Gregg shut down the plant in early November of 1988 and
turned to the federal government for help. Gregg blamed ―foreign competition‖
and the high price of raw materials for the plant‘s closure, but the increasing
cleanup costs and fines must have also played a role.274 Most importantly,
however, closing the factory allowed Gregg to engage in brinkmanship with
several federal defense agencies. At the height of the Cold War, the agencies
needed to keep Avtex in business, if only for long enough to arrange a new
supplier of a specialized product made only at Avtex in Front Royal: carbonized
(or carbonizable) rayon, a critical component of certain military armaments and
aerospace technologies.275 Virginia Senator John Warner helped broker a
federal bailout by securing $43 million in contracts from the Department of
Defense and the National Aeronautic and Atmospheric Administration (NASA).
Warner declared, ―It is essential to our national security to keep this plant
operating.‖ Avtex had to hand over its patent rights to the carbonizable rayon
manufacturing process to NASA, but the company survived, reopening the
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Front Royal plant on November 10, 1989.276 Avtex settled the lawsuit with the
Commonwealth of Virginia by agreeing to pay certain fines, fix safety violations,
and clean up its mess. However, little changed in the coming months, and
safety and environmental conditions continued to deteriorate.
Between November 1988 and November 1989, Avtex broke the terms of
its lawsuit settlement, violated its NPDES permit on at least ninety-nine days,
and received a cleanup order from the EPA that required Avtex and FMC
Corporation—the facility‘s owner from 1963-1976—to decontaminate the site‘s
groundwater at a cost of roughly $9.1-million.277 The rayon plant was selfdestructing due to decades of flawed waste disposal practices, but the final blow
came from a chemical not directly involved in rayon manufacturing. In April of
1989, during routine monitoring studies, SWCB scientists found highly-toxic
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in the tissue of fish in the Shenandoah River
downstream of the Avtex site. Following Clean Water Act protocols, SWCB
scientists routinely ―monitor[ed] fish tissue and sediment‖ to detect aquatic
contamination.278 They painstakingly traced the PCBs back to Avtex. Further
inquiry showed that the materials originated in a blown-out electrical
transformer on the roof the plant. Records revealed that Avtex had knowingly
discharged the pollutants into the South Fork for multiple years.
In August 1989, the Commonwealth of Virginia filed a second lawsuit
against Avtex Fibers, focused this time on the PCB violations. The EPA‘s $9.1276
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million groundwater cleanup order followed in early November. Then on
November 9, 1989, the State Water Control Board took the unusual step of
voting to revoke Avtex‘s NPDES permit. The situation demonstrated a profound
reversal: during World War II, the river‘s aquatic species had few defenders; no
limits existed on pollutants from the rayon plant; and environmental harms
were not a priority for state or federal government. Now a major industrial
facility and regional employer, with close ties to the national defense apparatus,
faced steep fines and legal action by both the state and federal government for
harming the Shenandoah River ecosystem.
The SWCB‘s permit revocation vote did not require the plant to shut
down. In the NPDES system, revocation of a permit differed from permit
termination, keeping open the possibility of future reissuance. In addition,
Avtex had the right to appeal the Board‘s revocation order. Instead, John Gregg
chose once again to close the factory. On November 10th, the day after the
SWCB‘s vote, Gregg ordered the boiler room to shut down, cutting electricity for
the entire facility. Employees were left standing next to their machines in the
dark with no idea what had happened or where to go. John Torrence, FMC‘s
manager of remediation for the Superfund site, said it took hours for the
building to be evacuated.279 The sudden closure violated labor contracts and
left over 400 workers unemployed with no warning. For their part, Gregg and
the other Avtex owners walked away largely unscathed; their company—Avtex
Fibers-Front Royal, Inc.—declared bankruptcy three months later, leaving FMC
and taxpayers to shoulder the cleanup costs.280

279

Torrence, personal conversation.

280

Environmental Background Information Center, 10.

125
The actions of many managers of the rayon facility, particularly during
its final years, reflect a degree of arrogance and carelessness with regard to the
environment. The on-going relationship between the rayon plant and U.S.
military interests is one possible reason behind this attitude. As the largest
supplier of war-critical rayon tire cord during World War II, government
requirements allowed American Viscose to ignore any environmental
repercussions of their waste. The situation changed rapidly after the war with
Virginia‘s 1946 Water Control law; however, a sense of stasis remained at the
factory, limiting further improvements to the waste treatment system. By the
1970s, when stronger environmental laws came into force, the rayon plant, now
operated by Avtex Fibers, was again manufacturing a militarily-critical material.
This time, however, Avtex was not just a major producer but the sole supplier.
Connection to the powerful momentum of the Cold War militaryindustrial complex provided a degree of shielding against environmental
regulation, particularly in the final years of the plant‘s operating life. During
the 1960s, as part of the Cold War arms race and space race, scientists sought
a material that could withstand high temperatures for use on rocket and
missile nozzles. The most effective material developed was called carbonized
rayon, created by converting rayon into graphite fibers. In the 1970s, Avtex
purchased the patent to make the rayon yarn needed for carbonizable rayon.
Although some of the rayon was used for tennis rackets and boat hulls, NASA
and the Department of Defense were the main purchasers:
Besides shuttle booster motors, the rayon material is critical to the
MX and Trident 2 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Delta,
Atlas and Titan launch vehicles, reentry vehicles, and tactical
missiles including AMRAAM, SRAM-2, Standard, Stinger and
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Tomahawk. Avtex is a fifth-level subcontractor to U. S. rocket
motor manufacturers.281
Like American Viscose‘s importance during World War II as the largest
manufacturer of high-tenacity rayon, Avtex held a crucial place during the Cold
War as the sole producer of carbonized rayon. By relying on Avtex, however,
NASA and the military put themselves in a precarious position. After Avtex
closed the first time in 1988, defense industry contractors were told that if
Avtex remained closed, the existing supply of carbonized rayon would last only
until March 1989.282 Avtex‘s managers used this unique position to leverage
the NASA and military contracts that allowed the company to reopen after its
first closure in 1988.
These federal contracts came with no requirement to clean up the
environmental or safety hazards at Avtex. In essence, Avtex‘s supporters within
the national security arena sanctioned the severe problems at the facility. It
seems possible that Avtex‘s truculence was a result, or at least a side effect, of
its deep engagement with military interests—not because these interests
encouraged pollution per se, but because it was a second tier concern. During
World War II and the Cold War, national security could, and often did, trump
environmental regulations. As a result, federal facilities often have worse rates
of compliance with federal water quality laws than privately-owned plants.283
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But times do change, and environmental damage can become so severe
that attitudes change. The political climate shifted somewhat following the
inauguration of George H.W. Bush. The EPA under Ronald Reagan was a weak
agency, hesitant to use the full power of the Superfund Act against Avtex. In
contrast, Bush‘s appointee for EPA Administrator was William K. Reilly, a
former president of the World Wildlife Fund, who promised enforcement of
hazardous waste cleanup laws during his confirmation hearings.
Internationally, some Cold War tensions had eased with liberalization of Soviet
regimes in the Eastern Bloc and the U.S.S.R.284 Perhaps this helped Senator
Warner to shift gears, stating in September 1989, after the PCB violations were
confirmed, that the environment must take precedence over national security,
and that Avtex should close if it was financially unable to stop polluting.285 He
took a tour of the facility just before the end of its operational life, saying, ―As a
lay person, I found it shocking… The management freely discussed that they
could no longer operate this machinery because it was broken down, it was
rusted, it leaked, and was presumably contaminated.‖286
Ralph Bolgiano, the former SWCB biologist, theorized that Avtex shut the
doors on November 10, 1989 expecting to be bailed out a second time. He
described a meeting that occurred immediately after the closure:
I remember the [Avtex] plant manager saying, ―we‘ve got a real
problem here.‖ And the EPA said… ―what‘s that? We want to
know about that.‖ And the plant manager said something like…
284
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―we‘ve got all the viscose in those lines, and if we don‘t do
something quick, it‘s going to harden up.‖ I remember the EPA
guys saying, “well, is that going to hurt the river?” There‘s this big
long pause. And the plant manager says, ―well, no. But there‘s
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment that‘s going to
be worthless.‖ And the EPA guy said, ―ok, next question.‖ He
really didn‘t care. It wasn‘t his job to care. Nobody had told him,
―save the plant.‖ And he didn‘t… That place hardened up, and it
would have cost more to start it again than it was worth… That‘s
the real reason they‘re gone. They thought they would be coaxed
into firing up again, and nobody coaxed. Nobody blinked.287
This story illustrates the tremendous power shift between the river and the
factory in the decades between 1940 and 1989. The Shenandoah had again
attracted powerful allies willing—at least in this extreme instance—to privilege
environmental protection over business interest.

Figure 18. Ralph Bolgiano at the rayon plant’s discharge pipe, no longer pumping out “hot, soapy,
nasty water,” on November 11, 1989, the day after the facility closed. Source: Virginia DEQ, “An
Environmental History: The 1980s,” http://www.deq.state.va.us/history/1980s.html
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Shutting down with no preparation did indeed leave chemical chaos
behind, destroying costly machinery and creating hazardous conditions for
others to clean up. Chemicals remained in pipelines, machines, and
laboratories. Waste viscose hardened in the lines, rendering much of the
equipment unsalvageable. As the EPA began the slow process of
decontamination, they found dangerous conditions inside a devastated factory.
Multiple potentially hazardous chemicals used to manufacture rayon were
stored inside the plant, ―such as carbon disulfide, sodium hydroxide, ethylene
diamine, phenol, sulfuric acid, zinc salts, sodium sulfate, sodium hypochlorite,
solvents, and fuels.‖288 As the closed facility steadily degraded after 1989,
containment and cleanup became more difficult and potentially dangerous.
Over time, off-gassing from clogged pipes and sewer systems created
concentrations of carbon disulfide and hydrogen sulfide gases in the buildings
that were both toxic and potentially explosive. In other locations, the acids
used in the acid bath stage had eaten through pipes, sewers, manhole covers,
even concrete. The PCB discharge into the South Fork had contaminated the
storm sewer system for the entire facility. By all accounts, the place was a
mess. A 1993 Halliburton report recommending remediation procedures
describes some of the conditions:
Solid and semisolid viscose and crumb remain in process vessels,
and piping contains liquid process chemicals. Carbon disulfide in
concentrations up to 20,000 ppm may be present in the viscose
liquids and slurries. Dried viscose hangs from process equipment
and crumb is strewn amid the equipment within the churn and
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mix rooms. Laboratory chemicals are isolated within locked
rooms.289
Descriptions of pictures taken in March 1987 by former employee Barry Mills
show that similarly grim conditions existed several years before the plant
closed: ―dark rooms full of rusted machines, walkways covered with slime, open
vats of acid, gaping holes where chemicals ate through concrete floors and,
covering almost everything, the white residue of evaporating acids.‖ 290
The EPA took on the task of decontaminating the buildings to the extent
that they could. The acid building was considered too structurally unstable
due to corrosion and was simply demolished. In the end, the EPA ascertained
that the buildings were so contaminated that the best option was to remove
them all, opening the land for re-development. One of the final site remediation
projects continuing as of 2010 is the removal of the plant‘s sewer system. The
Army Corps of Engineers undertook the actual demolition of the Avtex
buildings. It is a point of pride with John Torrence, also reflected on the Corps‘
website, that significant quantities of materials, including ―structural steel,
pipes, valves, ducts, metal siding, etc. [were] disposed of as recycled material
for melting and reuse. Concrete and stone [were] crushed to pebble size for
beneficial reuse on site.‖291 Visitors to the site today can still see piles of
crushed brick awaiting use to fill and stabilize the sulfate and viscose basins.
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Those viscose basins, the major source of groundwater contamination
from the rayon plant, however, remain precarious over twenty years after rayon
production ceased. The eight viscose basins filled prior to 1958 had
substantially dried and decomposed; the EPA determined that these could be
capped and left on-site as part of the remediation.292 The three newer, leaking
pits remain on-site and continue to leak. As Exponent Engineering notes,
waste viscose is 85% water with a soft, rubbery consistency: ―this type of
material has never been remediated before, and its low load-bearing capacity
precludes the use of heavy equipment that would normally be employed.‖293
Without the ability to use bulldozers to excavate the material, the only option at
present is to pump out leachate from the viscose basins to prevent further
percolation into the groundwater and monitor the results.
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Figure 19. Partial view of a full waste viscose basin, April 2009. The three newer basins, filled
between 1958-1983, are responsible for contaminating groundwater beneath the site.
Photo by the author.

As this problem highlights, remediation efforts on a Superfund site, like
the waste treatment procedures at an operational rayon plant, are far from
perfect. A tremendous amount of waste remains on the 440-acre site, either in
landfills or in capped basins, requiring on-going monitoring to ensure that
contaminants do not spread again in the future. By law, the EPA has to
consider questions of cost, feasibility and effectiveness when deciding on a
course of action, as well as the extent to which it will meet standards for
protection of human and ecological health. In the case of the earlier viscose
basins and various other contaminated landfill materials, capping the sites with
soil, installing leachate drains, and long-term monitoring of the sites are
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considered the best cost-effective options. Maximizing safety and cleanup is not
necessarily the goal; indeed, there is a philosophical dilemma of whether it is
possible to maximize cleanup. Like the calcium sulfate and zinc hydroxide
removed from the rayon plant‘s waste stream or the fly ash collected from the
boiler plant, whatever toxics are removed from the 440 acres beside the South
Fork must go somewhere. The materials not buried or reused on site now
reside in various hazardous waste landfills in multiple locations including Ohio,
Utah, and Canada.294

294
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Chapter 7
The Values of Precaution

The history of technology offers numerous examples of relationships like
the river-plant complex formed by the rayon plant at Front Royal and the South
Fork of the Shenandoah River. Courtaulds, Ltd. and its AVC subsidiaries, the
original plant owners, innovated the viscose rayon-manufacturing technology
and initiated the relationship with the South Fork, in search of economic gain.
The plant opened in an era when water quality protection was a side issue, the
domain of sport fishermen, public health officials, and sanitary engineers.
Legal regulation of industrial pollution, in most instances, seemed to receive
little consideration. Given its legacy of contamination, descriptions of the Front
Royal rayon plant as ―state of the art‖ in 1940, with a recovery system capable
of reclaiming chemicals and keeping waste out of the river,295 speak volumes to
the assumptions and understandings of the time regarding chemical pollution.
Combining such limited foreknowledge with the agency of ecological
systems—the South Fork‘s ―life of its own beyond our control‖296—creates a
dangerous scenario, played out time and again as modern technological
systems utilize more raw materials and produce more toxic wastes. For the
rayon plant at Front Royal, World War II was the turning point, forcing
expansion of the plant‘s technological system with astonishing rapidity, adding
tremendous mass to the technology‘s momentum, and placing the river, and the
environment in general, at the lowest level of consideration. Dismantling that
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momentum took forty-nine years. Changes in societal concern for the
environment led to a steady strengthening of environmental laws, culminating
in almost a decade of trial and error efforts by the federal government, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, sportsmen, homeowners, and many more to force
the rayon plant into regulatory compliance. Even today, twenty-one years after
Avtex closed, remnants of the rayon factory‘s technological momentum continue
to interact with the river, as efforts to remediate contamination at the site
continue.
Similarly, despite societal shifts toward environmental protection since
World War II, social constructs from that era continue to haunt present-day
efforts to prevent harm to ecological systems. Judgments regarding the
primacy of military and economic needs over environmental protection went
unquestioned in the years immediately following World War II. The ―good‖
things provided by the rayon plant—materials to win a war and strengthen
national security, products for consumers, paychecks and tax dollars for the
community—had the highest value to the most people and were thus assumed
to be most important. The benefits outweighed, and perhaps even justified, the
―bad‖ pollution flowing into the Shenandoah River. These types of value
judgments remain common in environmental disputes today.297
As the history of the river and factory demonstrates, however, human
benefit and environmental harm exist in two physically interconnected but
morally separate spheres. The moral necessity of defeating Nazi Germany on
tires made with rayon cord had no impact on the ability of riverine life to
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withstand the massive onslaught of chemical waste during the war. Indeed,
none of the human enrichment derived from the rayon plant at Front Royal
could ameliorate any of the physical harm done to the Shenandoah River.
Likewise, neither the war nor the plant‘s employees caused the harm directly.
Aquatic species died because concentrations of chemicals, nutrients, and
particulate matter reached a level that aquatic insects, plants, fish, and other
river life could not survive. The river has agency; it also has limits. The
unpredictability of the Shenandoah River ecosystem escapes full human
understanding, but when it comes to pollution—of any sort—the river cannot
decide whether or not to die; it can only respond to changes in chemistry.
Current environmental laws do a reasonable job of taking this reality into
account. An even more hopeful path would change the balance between rivers
and factories in the future even further, placing the burden of proof on the
factory to demonstrate its ability to prevent damage to the river in advance.
Such a precautionary approach recognizes the agency of ecological systems and
the limits inherent in human understanding of these systems. A formallyarticulated concept of precaution exists already in scientific, advocacy, and
global governmental circles. The values of this Precautionary Principle call for
protection of health and environment in advance of moving forward with new
technologies, even ―in the absence of environmental certainty,‖ as opposed to
current policies such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis
[that] give the benefit of the doubt to new products and
technologies, which may later prove harmful. And when damage
occurs, victims and their advocates have the difficult task of
proving that a product or activity was responsible. The
precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof, insisting that
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those responsible for an activity must vouch for its harmlessness
and be held responsible if damage occurs.298
The precautionary principle works hand-in-hand with the ―multilinear‖ nature
of technological development and of human interactions with the natural world.
The concept does not advocate a single designated outcome, rather it sets limits
around multilinear developments, seeking to close off the most
environmentally-harmful paths before they are taken.
Responding to calamitous pollution problems both in the Shenandoah
River and around the world during the decades between 1940-1989, humans
succeeded in shifting the power dynamics between the Shenandoah River and
the rayon factory at Front Royal. This demonstrates the ability of human
actions to counter the momentum of technological systems. Such momentum
belongs to the human sphere; it is not an autonomous force outside of human
control. As such, these technological systems, built by humans, can and
should be judged by human values and self-interest. In contrast to ecological
systems that have agency beyond human control, technological systems can
incorporate and respond to changes in values. Thomas Hughes agrees that
―contingencies and catastrophes‖ are not the only forces capable of breaking
technological momentum; a change in values might do so as well.299
This is a difficult goal. As Hughes also intimates, the technological
momentum surrounding many human-built systems includes a multiplicity of
values—from greed to grace—gathered over the years of a technology‘s
development and utilization. As the history of the rayon-plant complex at Front
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Royal demonstrates, merging or replacing those values with newer ones that
place limits around human desire may take decades. Shifting societal values
toward precaution will undoubtedly seem counterintuitive and uncomfortable to
a great many people. The process of changing values may be messy and
chaotic, rife with failures and unintended consequences, but it is, ultimately,
possible.
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